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The "Poison Pill" in the USMCA:
The Erosion of WTO Principles
and its Implications under a USChina Trade War
Gil Lan*
ABSTRACT

The United States, Canada, and Mexico have ratified a
multilateral trade agreement (the "USMCA") that contains a highly
unusual provision. This provision (referred to as the 'Poison Pill") is
intended to deter the signatories from entering into a free trade
agreement (FTA) with any "non-market country." The Poison Pill was

introduced by the United States in the wake of the US-China trade war
and was most likely directed at deterringCanadafrom entering into an
FTA with China.
This Article argues that the PoisonPill is functionally an expulsion
clause (as opposed to a withdrawal clause) which violates the USMCA
parties'preexisting obligations under the WTO Agreement regarding
FTAs. This is because the Poison Pill raises barriers to trade and is
unnecessary for the formation of an FTA. Paradoxicallythe PoisonPill

also depends on the WTO Agreement's Most Favored Nation (MFN)
provision to more effectively limit a nation's ability to enter into FTAs

with a "non-marketcountry."
It is troubling that the United States used the coercive and

unjustified impositionof tariffs, under the guise of nationalsecurity, as
negotiating leverage in USMCA negotiations. The United States has
also indicated that it may include Poison Pills in future FTAs. This
Article proposes two strategiesfor minimizing the impact of the Poison
Pill on nations who may be coerced into accepting it: entering into

overlapping multilateral FTAs and forging economic relationships
outside of the "FTA-box."If the United States cannot credibly commit to

WTO rules then non-US nations will have to turn to other superpowers
(e.g., China and the EU) and large trading blocs to counterbalancean
overreaching United States. These strategies align with a broader
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University. The author would like to thank his colleagues in the Canadian Academy of
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of Legal Studies in Business (International)) for all of their support and providing a
stimulating intellectual environment to discuss important legal issues.
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imperative: dealing with a United States that will not commit itself to
a rules-based tradingorder with even its long-standingallies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States, Canada, and Mexico have now each ratified a

multilateral trade agreement (the USMCA)1 that contains a highly
unusual provision-a clause intended to deter any of the signatories
from entering into a free trade agreement with any non-market

country. Article 32.10 of the USMCA 2 (Poison Pill) states that if any
signatory enters into a free trade agreement with a non-market
country, then the remaining signatories may terminate the USMCA
(upon provision of 6 months' notice) and carry on a bilateral agreement

between themselves on substantially the same terms as the USMCA.
This unusual provision quickly became known as the "poison pill"-a

term which was used by U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
himself.3

1.
and

Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States,

Canada,

Dec.

13,

2019,

OFFICE

U.S.

TRADE

REP.,

https://ustr.gov/trade-

agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween [http://perma.cc/C4SH-TNSW] (archived July 18, 2020) [hereinafter USMCA];
see also David Ljunggren, CanadianParliamentrushes through ratificationof USMCA
trade
pact,
REUTERS
(Mar.
13,
2020,
11:53
AM),
https://ca.reuters.com/article/idCAKBN2102I5 [http://perma.cc/C63R-NAQJ] (archived
July 18, 2020] ("Canada was the last of the three signatories to formally adopt the pact,
prompting congratulations from the United States and Mexico.").
2.
USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, $¶ 5-6.
3.
David Lawder & Karen Freifeld, Exclusive: U.S. Commerce's Ross eyes antiChina 'poison pill' for new trade deals, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018, 4:17 PM),
https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-usa-trade-ross-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-commerces-

ross-eyes-anti-china-poison-pill-for-new-trade-deals-idUSKCN1MF2HJ
[https://perma.cc[HTZ9-37DS] (archived July 18, 2020) (quoting Ross as saying, "It's
logical, it's a kind of poison pill," with regard to the Poison Pill provision). It is worth
noting that the term "poison pill" is often associated with US corporate law. In this
context, the corporate "poison pill" refers to technique for defending a corporation against
a hostile takeover. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27
J. CORP. L. 381, 382-83 (2002) (describing how corporate law "poison pill" works); see
also Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 147-52 (2016)
(summarizing the case law on the corporate law "poison pill"). The term "poison pill" was
probably intended to convey the idea that the USMCA uses a triggering event (i.e.
entering into an FTA with a non-market economy country) to allow the other parties
some type of recourse - such that the clause deters others from engaging in the triggering
event.
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Although the Poison Pill does not explicitly single out any country
as being a non-market country, 4 it is generally viewed as being directed
at China5 and was introduced into the USMCA by the United States.
In an interview with Reuters, Ross confirmed that the provision was
6
intended to counter China's trade practices. This is unsurprising in
light of the trade war between the United States and China, which
7
started in 2018 with an "opening salvo" of tariffs imposed by the

United States on China. Moreover, the clause did not go unnoticed in
Canada or China. One Canadian perspective was that the Poison Pill
to Canada's sovereignty. 8 In Canada, the Chinese

was an affront
Embassy directly denounced the Poison Pill as "hegemonic action"

USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, ¶ 1. The USMCA defines a "non-market
4.
economy" as any country, as of the date of signing the USMCA, any party has so
designated as a non-market economy provided that no party has a free trade agreement
with that country. See id.
See Sergio Puig, The United States-Mexico-CanadaAgreement: A Glimpse into
5.
the Geoeconomic World Order, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 56, 59 (2019) (discussing the
Poison Pill and stating "[b]ut if there were any doubt as to the new approach behind the
USMCA, two clauses aimed at China discourage partners from establishing free trade
agreements with a 'non-market economy' or granting similar enforceable investment
benefits to that economy's investors"); see also Chad P. Brown, The 5 Surprising things
about the new USMCA trade agreement, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2018, 6:00 AM),
9
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/0 /the-5-surprising[https://perma.cc/UL7Cthings-about-the-new-usmca-trade-agreement/?noredirect=on
2MAN] (archived July 18, 2020) ("Finally, Article 32.10 signals the consequences of
negotiating a potential free-trade agreement with any nonmarket economies - that is a
code word for 'China."'); Bhavan Jaipragas, US-China trade war: Trump gets his
(USMCA) clause out in Asia, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 21, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2169443/us-china-trade-war-trumpgets-his-usmca-clause-out-asia [https://perma.cc/5WHK-SK7P] (archived July 18, 2020)
("Washington's anti-China poison pill in its trade deal with Mexico and Canada - the
32.10 clause - could be copied in agreements with Asian countries to ratchet up the
pressure on Beijing[.]"); Josh Wingrove, Nafta's ChinaClauseIs Latest Blow to Trudeau's
EDT)
AM
11:08
2018,
5,
(Oct.
BLOOMBERG
Ambitions,
Asia
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-04/nafta-s-china-clause-is-latestblow-to-trudeau-s-asia-ambitions [https://perma.cc/FR4M-P2UW] (archived July 18,
2020) (referring to the Poison Pill as "essentially a China clause, with the Trump
administration gearing up for trade war with Beijing.").
See Lawder & Freifeld, supra note 3 ("Ross said in an interview that the
6.
provision was "another move to try to close loopholes" in trade deals that have served to
"legitimize" China's trade, intellectual property and industrial subsidy practices.").
Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Peril of Economic
7.
Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 115,
168 (2019).
Wenran Jiang, a senior fellow at the Institute of Asian Research, School of
8.
Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia stated that the Poison
Pill amounted to Canada surrendering a "crucial sovereign right." See Wenran Jiang,

Opinion, Under USMCA, Canada is neither strong nor free, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-under-usmca-canada-is-neither-

strong-nor-free/ [https://perma.cc/YRP2-42SA] (archived July 18, 2020); see generally
Neil Macdonald, Opinion, With its new trade deal, Canadasurrenders sovereignty to a
bully:
Neil
Macdonald,
CBC
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2018,
4:08
PM),
[https://perma.cc/3X2Thttps://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/canada-usmca-1.4845494
SLQN] (archived July 18, 2020).
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Editorial opinion pieces on several Chinese media websites also

expressed displeasure with the Poison Pill. The Poison Pill was viewed
as a desperate attempt by the United States to maintain global
dominance1 0 by sabotaging China's attempts to build an array of
FTAs.1 1 As one commentator noted: "Unmistakably it is an attempt to
isolate China."12
The United States, Canada, and Mexico are each members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).1 3 As members of the WTO, they are

also subject to the trade-liberalizing regime established under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 14 Since the Poison
Pill is directed at deterring USMCA members from entering into a
FTA 15 with China (the second largest economy in the world in terms of

9.
Press Release, Yang Yundong, Spokesperson, Chinese Embassy in Canada,
USMCA
Section
32.1
(Oct.
5,
2018),
http://ca.chineseembassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1602081.htm
[https://perma.c/AQU3-VDT7]
(archived July 18, 2020).
10.
See Wang Li, Opinion, Poisonpill terms will kill fairtrade, CHINA DAILY, (Oct.
25,
2018),
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/25/WS5bdOf7O5a310eff3032845de.html
[https://perma.cc/AS45-RJWK] (archived July 18, 2020) ("The Trump administration is
worried that China's rise as a great power will undermine its advantages. The US is
attempting to use the poison pill terms in its trade agreements in order to prevail in
what it regards as competition with a rival, and so control the rule-making power of
foreign trade rules in the long term to sustain its preeminence.").
11.
See Dong Yan & Bai Jie, Opinion, China and Canada eye more mutually
beneficial
trade
deal,
CHINA
DAILY,
(Nov.
21,
2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/21/WS5bf491e6a3 10eff303289f50.html
[https://perma.cc/G8QN-YEW5] (archived July 18, 2020) (characterizing the Poison Pill
as a US "strategy ... to prevent the advancement of bilateral FTAs between countries
such as Mexico and Canada and China, and disrupt China's goal of building an FTA
network.").

12. Li Yong, Opinion, U.S. "PoisonPill"Is Poisoning the World, BEIJING REV.,
(Oct.12, 2018), http://www.bjreview.com/Opinion/201810/t20181016_800144242.html
[https://perma.ccM5Q9-MV3D] (archived July 18, 2020).
13.
As of July 29, 2016, the WTO consists of 164 members including Canada,
Mexico and the United States. For more information, see Members and Observers,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm

(last visited Mar. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8TLB-2SQ6] (archived July 18, 2020)
[Hereinafter WORLD TRADE ORG. Members and Observers]. The WTO was established

pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15,
1994,
1867
U.N.T.S.
154,
33
I.L.M.
1144,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/04-wto_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/M6HDVWXR] (archived July 18, 2020) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
14.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S.
194,
https://www.wto.org/english/dcs e/legale/gatt47_01_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5QCJ-UJ2R] (archived July 18, 2020) [hereinafter GATT]. For a
general overview of the GATT see The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD
TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/fact4_e.htm
(last
visited Aug. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ED4G-A9B6] (archived July 18, 2020).
15.
There are two other popular terms for these type of agreements - including
"regional trade agreement" abbreviated as "RTA" and "preferential trade agreement"
abbreviated as "PTA."
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GDP1 6 and a WTO member itself), it represents a significant attempt
to restrict international trade. Thus, the USMCA brings into sharp
focus an important but relatively unexplored issue in international
trade law literature-the permissible extent, if any, of trade-restrictive

clauses in regional and multilateral trade agreements under the
WTO. 17
In an article on a related theme, Daniela Caruso comments that
there is a developing body of scholarship that focuses on the harm
18
suffered by nations who are not party to a trade agreement. Caruso's
article advances this body of scholarship by demonstrating the
limitation of private law doctrines in addressing the plight of those
excluded "from deals struck by other parties"1 9 (i.e., FTAs),
20
The Poison Pill intensifies that
particularly developing nations.
theme in two important ways. First, like all FTAs, the USMCA
excludes nonmembers from the benefits of membership (e.g.,

preferential tariff rate). However,

the Poison Pill expands the

exclusionary nature of the USMCA by requiring that all its members
refrain from entering into an FTA with "non-marketeconomy" nations.

Second, the Poison Pill can affect relatively powerful or wealthy
countries (as opposed to Caruso's concern with less affluent nations).
The primary excluded nonparty is China-a formidable economic

power. The other affected parties are Canada and Mexico-both of
whom are relatively wealthy though not nearly as powerful as the

United States.

According to the World Bank, in 2018, China had the world's second largest
16.
economy measured in GDP while the United States ranked first. China's GDP was
13,608,151.86 (millions of US dollars) and the US GDP was 20,494,099.85 (millions of
BANK
WORLD
Data,
Bank
World
The
See
dollars).
US
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN&mostrecent_v
alue_desc=true (last visited Aug.29, 2019) [https://perma.cc[M7H2-UEX4] (archived July
18, 2020).
This article analyzes trade-restrictive or anti-competitive agreements
17.
between nations. This is distinct from the literature dealing with attempts to harmonize
the domestic competition law of different nations. That literature deals with harmonizing
competition laws regulating private actors, not regulating the anti-competitive conduct
of nations. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY

J. INT'L L. 355, 355 (2004) (arguing that countries should strive for a consensus on
international competition policy); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The
Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY
BUs. L.J. 37, 37-38 (2007) (stating that the best institutional body to address
international antitrust issues is the International Competition Network); Thanh Phan,
Realism and International Cooperation in Competition Law, 40 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 297,
298-99 (2017) (reviewing the obstacles in coordinating international competition law).
See Daniela Caruso, Non-Parties: The Negative Externalities of Regional
18.
Trade Agreements in a Private Law Perspective, 59 HARv. INT'L L.J. 389, 391-93 (2018).
Id. at 389.
19.
See id. at 391 ("...developing countries have much skin in the game of regional
20.
trade agreements ("RTAs") concluded by other nations and many reasons to worry about
their implementation.").
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The core claim of this Article is that the Poison Pill is a traderestrictive expulsion clause that violates the WTO Agreement.
Regardless of the Poison Pill's immediate impact, if any, on Canada,
the most troubling concern is the coercive manner in which it was

imposed by the United States. This Article's secondary claim is that,
under the current US-led erosion of the WTO, the Poison Pill
incentivizes middle-power nations (like Canada) and developing

nations to craft international trade strategies to counterbalance the
unilateral use of trade sanctions by the United States. These strategies
include forming an overlapping network of multilateral and bilateral
FTAs and entering into non-FTA economic relationships with other
nations. The result is a trend towards alienation of the United States
while nations turn to China, the EU, and multilateral relationships to

counterbalance a United States that does not credibly commit itself to
a rules-based trade order with even its long-standing allies.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II submits that the
Poison Pill is a trade-restrictive expulsion clause. It may appear that

the Poison Pill is irrelevant because there is a separate general
withdrawal clause under the USMCA which allows any party to
unilaterally withdraw from the USMCA upon six months' notice (the

same length of notice period as the Poison Pill). The Article analyzes
the USMCA's provision to draw attention to an important distinctionfunctionally, the Poison Pill expels the member that enters into an FTA
with a non-market economy nation. This is significantly different
because it preserves the status quo in favor of the party (e.g., the
United States) objecting to the non-market country free trade
agreement-thus saving that party from the costs of renegotiating

trade agreements with the remaining party (e.g., Mexico). The Article
then reviews the literature on withdrawal clauses, particularly the
work of Laurence Helfer, to conclude that the Poison Pill's power

exceeds that of a general withdrawal clause and truly turns an FTA
into what FTA critics term a "private club."

From a Canadian perspective, it is fortunate that Canada and
Mexico already have a free trade relationship in another multilateral
treaty-the newly formed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership 2 1 (CPTPP). This may appear to render
the Poison Pill a partially moot point for Canada. Even if Canada were
expelled from the USMCA, Canada would still at least have an FTA
with Mexico. This Article argues that this does not render the Poison
Pill irrelevant. It simply reinforces why it is important for middle
powers and developing nations to participate in overlapping

21.

See

Partnership,

Comprehensive
GOVT CANADA,

and

Progressive

Agreement

for

Trans-Pacific

https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-

agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptppptpgp.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Aug. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AL7X-A3BC]
(archived July 18, 2020) [hereinafter CPTPP] (ratified by Canada on October 29, 2018).
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multilateral FTAs to counter aggressive, non-WTO compliant US trade
sanctions. If there were no CPTPP or other overlapping multilateral

FTA, then Canada's position would be markedly different. Therefore,
the analysis continues as if there were no CPTPP (or other overlapping
multilateral FTA) to protect Canada in order to draw out the
implications for nations where there may not be any overlapping

multilateral FTA to insure against an expulsion provision like the
Poison Pill. Moreover, the United States has already indicated that it
may well attempt to insert clauses like the Poison Pill into its other
trade agreements. 22 For example, in the recent negotiation of a trade
agreement between the United States and United Kingdom, it has
been reported that the United States seeks to have a clause like the
Poison Pill inserted into the agreement.2 3 Therefore, an analysis of the
Poison Pill is relevant to all nations who may enter into trade

agreements with the United States, as well as the WTO, because of the
American threat of proliferating such restrictive trade clauses.
Part III asserts that the Poison Pill violates the USMCA parties'
obligations under the WTO Agreement. This violation is demonstrated
through an examination of the relevant provisions under the WTO
Agreement (GATT Article XXIV). This Article applies the principles
from WTO jurisprudence to the Poison Pill to conclude that the Poison

Pill contravenes GATT Article XXIV. This Article also suggests that
the WTO cannot take a neutral position on the Poison Pill. To illustrate
this point, this Article draws upon the work of American Legal

Realist-Robert Lee Hale.2 4 Hale's writings serve as a theoretical

foundation for the proposition that normative baselines can endow
parties with coercive market power-despite the illusion that

authorities appear to have not intervened at all. Similarly, the Poison
Pill paradoxically derives much of its coercive force from the normative

parameters established by the WTO Agreement-in particular-the
baseline of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (which states that

WTO members must treat each other equally with respect to trade

See Mimi Lau, US ready to squeeze China partners with poison pill' trade
22.
(Oct.
6,
2018,
12:45
PM),
MORNING
POST,
CHINA
deals,
SOUTH
https://www.semp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2167268/us-ready-squeeze-chinapartners-poison-pill-trade-deals [https://perma.cc/4WUB-WYU9] (archived July 18,
2020) ("Ross said the "poison pill" provision in the recently completed pact with Canada
and Mexico could be replicated with additional trading partners to pressure China to
open its markets."); see also Lawder & Freifeld, supra note 3 ("U.S. Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross signaled on Friday that Washington may flex its muscle with additional
trading partners in order to exert pressure on China to open its markets, saying that a
"poison pill" provision in the recently completed pact with Canada and Mexico could be
replicated.").
See Trade Talks between UK and US set to get under way, BBC NEWS (May
23.
4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-52528821 [https://perma.cc/3788-Q5E4]
(archived July 18, 2020).
See infra note 188; see generally Part III.B.2.
24.
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matters) and the establishment of FTAs as an exception to MFN
treatment.

Part IV situates the Poison Pill in the broader context of the global
trade order. The Poison Pill makes its appearance into the USMCA at
a time when the WTO faces a growing challenge to its relevance. This
challenge has been slowly growing over the last 30 years with the
proliferation of FTAs-to the extent that FTAs appear to be the norm
rather than the exception. A lead criticism of FTAs is that they may
divert trade from the most efficient producers. Since the Poison Pill
explicitly attempts to deter its members from an FTA with China (a
potentially efficient producer), the Poison Pill represents an
unprecedented and direct form of trade diversion.
This Article then considers the geopolitical implications of the
Poison Pill-focusing on how the United States unjustly used national
security exceptions to impose steel and aluminum tariffs upon several
nations. In part, those tariffs were used as negotiating leverage in

USMCA negotiations with Canada as well as to extract prohibited
"voluntary" trade concessions from Argentina, Brazil, and South
Korea. This Article suggests why it may not be practical for any nation

to challenge the United States on the Poison Pill at the WTO.
This Article does not address the normative question of whether
any nation (such as Canada) ought to engage in an FTA or other trade
relations with any other nation (such as China)-this is a complex
decision for each nation to consider exercising its sovereignty. Rather,
it considers how middle powers and developing nations who have
already decided to engage in deeper trade relations with another
country (designated as a non-market country by the United States)
may do so while operating under the constraints of a US Poison Pill
provision. This Article outlines two strategies: participation in
overlapping multilaterals to neutralize expulsion provisions and
thinking outside of the "FTA-box" to foster relationships with other

nations. Part V concludes by observing how the United States is
alienating itself from the global trade order while incentivizing other
nations to form alliances with other superpowers such as China and
the EU as well as multilaterals to counterbalance an overreaching US
approach to international trade.

II. THE USMCA POISON PILL-A TROUBLING TRADE-RESTRICTIVE
EXPULSION CLAUSE

The Poison Pill appears to be a withdrawal clause-a clause which
would allow two members of the USMCA to withdraw from the
USMCA upon the third country entering into an FTA with a non-

market economy. This Part argues that the Poison Pill is (1)
functionally similar to an expulsion clause (in comparison to a
withdrawal clause) and (2) a trade-restrictive provision whose power
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exceeds a withdrawal clause. This Part demonstrates that the Poison
2
Pill converts an FTA into what critics have termed a "private club.'"

It then considers how the Poison Pill has been used to entrench the
American threat of economic exclusion within the architecture of an
FTA. This Part ends with a discussion of why middle powers -and
developing nations should be concerned about the United States'

conduct.
A. Functionallyan Expulsion Clause-Not an Exit Clause
The USMCA is intended to be a successor to the North American
26
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was the previously existing

FTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. There was no
provision analogous to the Poison Pill in NAFTA. The Poison Pill is
found in a section of the USMCA which is generally

entitled

"Exceptions and General Provisions." 27 The Poison Pill is formally
entitled "Non-Market Country FTA" 28 and the key provision is found
in paragraph 5 which states that: "Entry by a Party into a free trade
agreement with a non-market country will allow the other Parties to
terminate this Agreement on six months' notice and replace this
29
Agreement with an agreement as between them (bilateralagreement)."
Note that the USMCA also contains a general withdrawal clause

which states that: "A Party may withdraw from this Agreement by
providing written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. A
withdrawal shall take effect six months after a Party provides written

notice to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, this Agreement shall
30
remain in force for the remaining Parties." Under NAFTA there is a
31
similar withdrawal provision.
Since any party can withdraw on six months' notice (for any

reason) under the general withdrawal clause, it may appear that the
Poison Pill makes little difference to the position of the parties.
However, there is one significant difference which may be illustrated

through a hypothetical. Imagine that Canada was about to enter into
an FTA with China, against the wishes of the United States. If the
United States were to use the general withdrawal provision, the

United States would exit the USMCA but the USMCA would still be

See Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A
25.
Trade Perspective, 8 CH. J. INT'L L. 535, 536 (2008).
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
26.
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. For a general overview of NAFTA, see Robert A. Blecker,
NAFTA, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 147, 147 (Robert L.

Looney ed., 2019).
USMCA, supranote 1, art. 32.
27.
Id. art. 32.10, ¶ 5.
28.
Id. (emphasis added).
29.
30. Id. art. 34.6 (emphasis added).
NAFTA, supranote 26, art. 2205.
31.
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valid between Canada and Mexico and the United States is the country
that has been isolated (by its own choosing).
On the other hand, if the United States invokes the Poison Pill,
then it terminates the USMCA and replaces the USMCA with a
bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico. According
to the Poison Pill, the bilateral agreement shall be the same as the
USMCA except those provisions which the United States and Mexico
agree are not applicable as between them.32 In this case, Canada is the
one left out and the United States and Mexico remain together in a
bilateral FTA.
Functionally, the Poison Pill is an expulsion clause. Despite the
procedural mechanics, the net effect is that the United States and
Mexico would be carrying on the USMCA as if Canada had been
expelled. In reality, Canada's membership in the CPTPP helps to
mitigate the consequences of this potential occurrence because Mexico
is also part of the CPTPP (along with Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan,

Malaysia, New Zealand, and Peru). 33 This allows Canada to preserve
an FTA with Mexico outside of the USMCA. 34 While this may be a
comfort for Canada (the CPTPP only entered into effect on December
30, 2018 3 5 -just slightly less than one year before the USMCA was
signed), it is still troubling from a broader international trade

perspective. If the United States does insert provisions like the Poison
Pill in multilateral agreements with other nations (as it has indicated
it might36 ), particularly developing nations who may not have a well-

developed FTA network, then the provision would retain its power.
Therefore, this Article proceeds in its analysis as if the CPTPP did not
exist in order to fully explore the ramifications of the Poison Pill under
these circumstances. Part IV flips this perspective to argue for the
importance of an overlapping multilateral strategy for middle powers
and developing nations.

Even if one accounts for the CPTPP as a buffer for Canada against
expulsion, the Poison Pill still provides a significant advantage to the

-

32.
USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, ¶ 6 ("The bilateral agreement shall be
comprised of all the provisions of this Agreement, except those provisions that the
relevant Parties agree are not applicable as between them."). The USMCA does not
specifically mention what would constitute terms that are not applicable between the
parties. A review of the USMCA reveal certain Canada-specific portions that would not
apply in the new bilateral agreement between the US and Mexico. These include these
include the Canadian tariff Schedule Appendix in USMCA art. 2 (national treatment) as
well as the USMCA Agreement Annexes which carve out specific provisions for each
country. See, e.g., id. Annex I Investment and Services Non-Conforming Measures
Canada (note that Annex II and III have similar Canada-specific provisions), Annex IV
- SOEs Non-Conforming Activities (prescribing specific exceptions for state-owned
enterprises including Canadian ones).
33.
See CPTPP, supra note 21.
34.
See id.
35.
Id.
36.
See Lau, supra note 22.
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United States. In this case, it is the preservation of the status quo-an
already negotiated agreement between the United States and
Mexico. 37 Imagine if there was no Poison Pill-only a mutual
agreement between the United States and Mexico to withdraw
simultaneously according to the general withdrawal provision. Both

countries would have to negotiate a new bilateral agreement-leaving
the door open to either country to renegotiate substantive terms. This
is a noteworthy risk for either country in light of a study that indicates
that, on average, the negotiation time for an FTA is twenty-eight
months. 38 In contrast, under the Poison Pill, the bilateral agreement

has already been authorized and the USMCA mandates that the
"bilateralagreement shall be comprised of all of the provisions of [the
USMCA] except those provisions that the relevant Parties agree are
not applicable as between them."39 Aside from protecting the status
quo from renegotiation by Mexico, it also protects the USMCA from
being renegotiated or opposed internally by opposing parties within the
United States' government who may seize the opportunity to

renegotiate the USMCA in accordance with their own political
agendas.
B. Poison Pill Compared to Withdrawal Clauses
The significance of the Poison Pill is apparent once situated in the
context of the scholarship on treaty withdrawal clauses (also referred
to as "exit clauses"). This topic received relatively little attention until

Laurence Helfer published a seminal article in 2005.40 He observes:
Exit clauses create discomfort for scholars and practitioners of international law.
To a profession anxious to prove that nations obey international legal
obligations, a state's right to unilaterally abrogate its treaty obligations-often
without substantive restraint or meaningful sanction-is not something to be

advertised. In fact, major public international law treatises (and even most
specialized studies of treaty law and practice) all but ignore exit or give the issue

37. The USMCA contemplates a relatively fast process for the implementation of
the bilateral agreement. Pursuant to USMCA art. 32.10, ¶ 7, the remaining parties are
to use the Poison Pill 6-month notice period to review the USMCA to determine if any
amendments are required to ensure its "proper operation" (implying that that the
amendments relate to procedure rather than substance). See USMCA, supra note 1,

32.10(7); see also id. art. 32.10, ¶ 8 ("The bilateral agreement enters into force 60 days
after the date on which the last party to the bilateral agreement has notified the other
party that it has completed its applicable legal procedures.").
38.
Christopher Moser & Andrew Rose, Why do trade negotiations take so long?,
Vox EUR. UNION, (June 8, 2012), https://voxeu.org/article/why-do-trade-negotiationstake-so-long [https://perma.cc/7WRD-BEHJ] (archived July 18, 2020) (noting that "[o]ur
data sample covers 88 regional trade agreements from 1988 to 2009. On average, trade
negotiations take 28 months, but there is large variation in the length of negotiations.").
USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, 1 6.
39.
See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1579 (2005).
40.
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only passing attention. This short shrift given to exit glosses over many
consequential issues of treaty design and practice. 4 1

He noted that a withdrawal clause is an "internationally lawful
act"4 2 and therefore allows a nation to exit a treaty while preserving

its international reputation. 43 Withdrawal clauses can act as an
"insurance policy" 44 and provide a country with a lawful exit if it later
decides that remaining a party is no longer in its interests. 45

Furthermore, a withdrawal clause confers power onto the nation
that can afford to exit a treaty. During the term of the treaty, a credible
threat of exit can provide the threatening nation the ability to

renegotiate the terms of the treaty,4 6 thus prompting Helfer to state
"[e]xit thus sits at a critical intersection of law and power in
international relations."4 7 Timothy Meyer has argued that withdrawal
clauses not only affect the parties' rights during the term of the treaty
but also influence the parties bargaining positions during treaty

negotiation. 48 According to Meyer, a nation confident its future
economic and political power will be in position to require either (or
both) of two conditions. It can either ask for relaxed exit conditions
(allowing it to easily withdraw and negotiate a new treaty with better
terms) or it can ask that the treaty contain other terms that it

prefers. 49 How does one attempt to lessen the potential impact of a
withdrawal provision? One method of partially neutralizing the power
of a withdrawal clause is to require a longer notice period.5 0
Alternatively, a nation could concede an easy exit withdrawal provision

Id. at 1592 (footnote omitted).
42.
Id. at 1589 (footnote omitted).
43.
See id. at 1621 ("The choice to denounce, therefore, together with any
explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an intent to "play by the
rules" of future treaties as well. As a result, the harm to the withdrawing state's
reputation as a law abiding nation may be minimal.").
44. Id. at 1591.
45.
See id.
46.
See id. at 1588.
47.
Id. Furthermore, the issue of exit exists in many legal relationships other
than treaties including in the regulatory sphere. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2015).
48.
See Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit, Costs and Renegotiation in International
Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J., 379, 382 (2010) (arguing that a "credible threat to exit" is a
source of negotiating leverage).
49.
Id. at 382-83.
50.
Barbara Koremenos & Allison Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 81, 82-83 (2010) (suggesting that longer notice periods promote other nations to enter
into a treaty since there would be less opportunity for strategic withdrawal).
41.
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51
or a
in exchange for greater voice within the treaty structure

52
substantive provision that favors its interests.

Does a nation that frequently invokes withdrawal clauses incur

any consequences? Although reliance upon a withdrawal clause would
be lawful under the treaty, its recurrent usage could have a negative
53
impact on the nation's reputation for credible long-term commitment.

However, a low occurrence of withdrawal may not heavily impact a
nation's reputation. Under these circumstances, Helfer suggests that a
withdrawal more closely resembles a nation that chooses to not ratify
a treaty5 4 but cautions that frequent withdrawals can be perceived as
55
the reputational equivalent of breaching a treaty.
Beyond reputational consequences there is also opportunity costa critical point for assessing the power of the Poison Pill. Under an

FTA, the benefits of that treaty are only available to the signatories of
that treaty. A nation that withdraws from an FTA foregoes all of the
benefits that membership might have conferred upon it. 56 Therefore,

treaty withdrawal also implies an opportunity cost. If the opportunity
cost is high enough, it may serve as a significant disincentive to
withdrawing from the FTA.
However, since the Poison Pill (with its "double withdrawal and

reconstitution

of the USMCA in bilateral

format" mechanism)

functions as an expulsion clause, nations invoking the Poison Pill do
not face the same disincentives as under a withdrawal clause. If the
United States and Mexico were to invoke this clause, they would only

be losing benefits granted by Canada. In contrast, if there was no
Poison Pill, the United States and Mexico would lose the benefits
granted by Canada and also face the risk that a bilateral agreement
between the two of them may require heavy renegotiation (or even

51.
Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 369 (2014) (noting how finding the right balance in treaties can be
addressed by "a relaxing of the burden of exiting, an increase in opportunities for voice,
or some combination of the two."). Katselas' work is an innovative application of insights
from organizational behavior scholarship, and she draws upon the well-known work of
Albert O. Hirschman. Id. at 318 (citing ALBERT O. HIRScHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)).

52.
53.
54.
55.
clause in

See Meyer, supra note 48, at 382-83.
See Helfer, supra note 40, at 1622-23.
See id.
See id. While a nation can choose whether or not to include a withdrawal
a treaty, an interesting question explored in the literature is whether a nation

may withdraw from customary international law. For an informative discussion see

Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary InternationalLaw and Withdrawal Rights
in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 1 (2010).
See Helfer, supra note 40, at 1636-37 ("The ability to exclude non-members
56.
means that a state which unilaterally withdraws from a trade agreement cannot

surrender the burdens of membership without also relinquishing its benefits. The
prospect of losing these benefits is sufficient to deter states from leaving, even where the
treaty provides an unfettered right to withdraw.").
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worse, the bilateral agreement might fail to materialize if domestic
interests rally against its ratification).

C. Poison Pill Converts the USMCA into a True "PrivateClub"
Since FTAs confer benefits between their signatory nations, FTAs
have been likened to a "private club" with nations representing the

members of this exclusive club and the benefits representing the
"private goods" enjoyed by the members. 5 7 Yet, Christopher Brummer
has correctly argued that this analogy is not entirely accurate based on
his study of the legal literature on clubs and regional groupings like

FTAs. 5 8 He astutely observes that:
[F]ree trade treaties like NAFTA and CAFTA impose no legal restrictions as to
their relationships on member states as to their relationships with third party
countries. Signatories to free trade treaties can (and do) offer access to thirdparty countries on terms equal to those available to members. As a result, these
"open" RIAs create nonexcludable "impure" public goods. 59

In short, FTAs are not truly like private clubs because member

nations are free to provide similar benefits to non-member nations by
entering into other bilateral agreements or FTAs with non-member
nations.
Yet, the Poison Pill is an unprecedented twist in the world of

FTAs. Unlike the generic FTAs described by Brummer, the USMCA,
via the Poison Pill, does impose a restriction upon dealing with thirdparty countries (i.e., non-market economy countries). 60 This unique
trade-restrictive feature aligns the USMCA more closely with being a
private club. The USMCA functions like a private club which places

trade restrictions on its members and a breach of those restrictions can
result in expulsion from the club.

Therefore, the Poison Pill does provide a strategic advantage to
the parties invoking it and it is significantly different from the general
withdrawal provision. In addition, there are three more points worth
considering in evaluating the Poison Pill's degree of coerciveness in this
private club.
First, the term "non-market economy" is not defined specifically.
Instead, the Poison Pill states that a "non-market economy" is any
country which a signatory has (as of the date of signing the USMCA)
"determined to be a non-market economy for the purposes of its trade
remedy laws." 61 Second, the term "free trade agreement" is not

57.

See Brummer, supra note 25.

58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 546.
60.
USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, ¶ 5.
61.
Id. art. 32.10, $ 1(a). However, this does not apply if a USMCA already has
an existing FTA with that country. See id. art. 32.10, ¶ 1(b).
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specifically defined for the purposes of the Poison Pill which brings into
question the exact extent to which parties may trade with a nonmarket economy. 6 2 Third, the Poison Pill does not provide any time

limit for its invocation.6 3 Theoretically, it could be invoked years after
one of the parties entered into a FTA with a non-market economy.
D. Poison Pill as an Instrument of US Coercion
The Poison Pill can be understood as an instrument of political
coercion implemented within the architecture of an FTA. An
examination of the political context surrounding USMCA negotiations

reveals how the United States effectively used unjustified trade
sanctions and a "divide and conquer" strategy to coerce Canada into
accepting the USMCA and Poison Pill. Canada is an affluent country,
but its weakness is its overdependency on US trade. Canada's
unpleasant experience serves as a warning beacon to other nationsespecially developing nations without overlapping FTA networks.

1. Political Context: The US-China Trade War
The United States' insistence that the Poison Pill be included in
the USMCA can be understood in the context of its current trade war
with China. US President Trump's "America First" platform includes
a perception that the United States is being exploited in international

trade. 64 Trump claims that the United States has been exploited in

Although there is no definition of a free trade agreement, USMCA Article 1.1
62.
references the GATT stating: "The Parties, consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT
1994 and Article V of the GATS, hereby establish a free trade area." Id. art. 1.1. This
could be interpreted to mean that anything that would constitute an agreement similar
to the USMCA would constitute a "free trade agreement" under the Poison Pill.
Although USMCA Article 32.10, paragraph 5 states that parties invoking the
63.
Poison Pill must provide 6 months' notice to the party that entered into an FTA with a
non-market country, there is no explicit time limit for the invocation that right. See id.
art. 32.10, ¶ 5.
Jill Colvin & Jonathan Lemire, Donald Trump says U.S. will no longer 'be
64.
taken advantage of' when it comes to trade, GLOBAL NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017, 11:24 AM),
https://globalnews.ca/news/3854071/donald-trump-trade-taken-advantage-of/
[https://perma.cc/5HHE-J7ZF] (archived July 18, 2020) (quoting President Trump as
saying "[w]e are not going to let the United States be taken advantage of anymore. I am
always going to put America first.").
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trade deals by Canada, 65 Mexico, 66 the EU, 6 7 and China. 68 Moreover,
the United States claims that China has engaged in unfair trade
practices including violations of China's WTO obligations 69 and forced
technology transfers imposed on US businesses. 70 Based on these
claims, on July 6, 2018, the United States commenced imposing a
tariff" of 25 percent on approximately $34 billion worth of Chinese
goods.7 2 In response, China strongly contested these claims, publishing
a white paper that replied to and denied these US allegations.7 3 In
addition, China has criticized the United States' international trade
practices-comparing the "America First"' approach to "unilateralism

65.
Meredith McGraw & John Parkinson, Trump's leaked 'off-record' comments
complicate trade deal with Canada, ABC NEWS (Sep. 1, 2018, 7:32 AM),
https://abenews.go.com/Politics/trumps-leaked-off-record-comments-complicate-tradedeal/story?id=57528243 [https://perma.cc/9RXG-2QLG] (archived July 18, 2020)
(quoting Trump as saying "I gave an interview yesterday to Bloomberg Business, and I
said 'off the record,' and I made a statement about Canada, which is fine because I love
Canada but they have taken advantage of our country for many years[.]").

66.
alarm

See Andres Villareal, Christopher Sherman & Peter Orsi, Trump tariff threat
Mexico

growers,

economists,

ASSOCIATED

PRESS,

(June

1,

2019),

https://www.apnews.com/6aca0c83523d41lca78d9c6e9ca5Oab4 [https://perma.cc/VBQ2G4CD] (archived July 18, 2020) (reporting that Trump had tweeted "Mexico has taken
advantage of the United States for decades.").
67.
See Don Pittis, Latest Trump attack on EU's Airbus could hit Canada, too:
Don
Pittis,
CBC
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2019
4:00
AM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/trump-trade-eu-canada-1.5090650
[https://perma.cc/G2PX-CLPX] (archived July 18, 2020) (reporting that Trump tweeted
"The EU has taken advantage of the U.S. on trade for many years. It will soon stop!").
68.
See President Donald Trump, Remarks in Monaca, Pennsylvania: American
Energy and Manufacturing, (Aug. 13, 2019) (transcript available at the White House)
(quoting Trump as saying "NAFTA - one of the worst trade deals ever. By the way,
World Trade Organization, it made China. China made themselves. They did a good job.
But they ripped off our country for years, and with our money and World Trade
Organization backing.").
69.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO
COMPLIANCE, at 3 (2018) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2018 REPORT]

(stating that "(1) WTO membership comes with expectations that an acceding member
not only will strictly adhere to WTO rules, but also will support and pursue open, marketoriented policies; (2) China has failed to comply with these expectations .... ").
70.
Id. ("Despite repeated commitments to refrain from forcible technology
transfer from U.S. companies, China continues to do so through market access
restrictions,

the

abuse of administrative

processes,

licensing

regulations,

asset

purchases, and cyber and physical theft.").
71.
Press Release, Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301
Action (July 10, 2018) (on file with the United States Trade Representative),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/statementus-trade-representative [https://perma.ccIN5UK-B9QG] (archived July 18, 2020).
72.
Details regarding this $34 Billion Trade Action (List 1) as well as the
subsequent additional lists of goods in the escalating trade war can be found at China
Section 301 - Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,

https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions
(last
visited Mar. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G6Z8-TFKE] (archived Aug. 13, 2020).
73.
The Facts and China's Position on China-U.S. Trade Friction, INFO. OFF.
STATE COUNCIL, CHINA (Sept. 24, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201809/24/c_137490176.htm [https://perma.cc/Q8CB-FVVT] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
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and economic hegemony" 74 and, ultimately, characterizes this US
approach as a distinct form of US "tradebullyism." 75 The salient point
raised by China, relevant to this Article's focus on the WTO, is that the
tariffs imposed by the United States were not authorized by the WTO
nor did the United States wait for the decision of any WTO disputesettlement panel. 76 In reply to the US imposed tariffs, China imposed

77
its own tariffs against $34 billion worth of US goods entering China.
While the US-China trade war continued, the United States was
78
engaged in trade negotiations on the North American front. Even
during his 2016 presidential campaign, President Trump had criticized
NAFTA and promised that he would have the United States

renegotiate the agreement with Canada and Mexico.

79

Between August

2017 and June 2018, the NAFTA negotiations went through seven
rounds. 80 During this time, trade relations became increasingly

strained as President Trump had the United States levy steel and
81
aluminum tariffs against both Mexico and Canada. President Trump

cited national security grounds as the basis for the tariffs, even though
such a claim is unjustified,82 and one scholar has stated that this type
of invocation (with respect to automobiles) "would further extend the

Id. at 4.
Id. at 52.
Id.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2018 REPORT, supra note 69, at 54 (noting
77.
also that China threatened to impose an additional tariff on $16 billion worth of U.S.
goods).
78.
See Emily Stephenson & Amanda Becker, Trump vows to reopen, or toss,
NAFTA pact with Canada and Mexico, REUTERS (June 28, 2016, 5:07 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election/trump-vows-to-reopen-or-toss-nafta[https://perma.cc/PW8W-ZZDE]
pact-with-canada-and-mexico-idUSKCNOZEOZ0
(archived Aug. 18, 2020).
See Rich Miller, Andrew Mayeda, & Jenny Leonard, Trump clears deck for
79.
74.
75.
76.

China trade war by striking new NAFTA deal, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018),

https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/trump-clears-deck-for-china-trade-war-by-striking-newnafta-deal-1.1145882 [https://perma.cc/5FF5-BE57] (archived Aug. 18, 2020). "President
Donald Trump looks to be preparing for a potentially protracted economic war with
China by clearing the decks of disputes with America's other trading competitors.... U.S.
negotiators clearly had China in mind when they hammered out the new trade deal with
Mexico and Canada to replace the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement that
Trump labeled a disaster." Id.
See Stephen Tapp, How NAFTA negotiations have progressed - A timeline of
80.
events,

EXPORTWISE

(Sept.

11,

2018),

https://www.edc.ca/en/blog/nafta-

negiotiations.html [https://perma.cc/45NX-GW2S] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
81.
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Euijin Jung, The USMCA, Newly Jeopardized,
Was Never a Free Trade Agreement, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., (June 4, 2019,

11:45 AM), https://www.piie.comfblogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/usmca-newlyjeopardized-was-never-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/QV6W-PJ24} (archived
Aug. 18, 2020) (noting that these tariffs were later removed by the US after Canada and
Mexico entered into the USMCA).
See supra Part III.B.1 for a detailed discussion.
82.
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precedent for applying tariffs to industries with only tenuous national
security ties but clear political ties."8 3

Moreover, it was clear that these tariffs were "leverage" 84 for the
United States during USMCA (i.e., the new "NAFTA") negotiations.

While referring to the decision to impose steel and aluminum tariffs on
Canada and Mexico, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross stated:
As to Canada, Mexico, you will recall the reason for the deferral (of tariffs) had
been pending the outcome of the NAFTA talks . . . .There is no longer a very
precise date when they may be concluded and therefore they were added into the
list of those who will bear tariffs. 8 5

It should be noted, even after the USMCA had been signed by all
parties, the United States persisted in its imposition of the aluminum

and steel tariffs against Canada. 86 Chrystia Freeland, Canada's
Foreign Affairs Minister, referred to U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur
Ross's comment that those tariffs were only imposed because the
USMCA negotiations were pending. 87 Freeland then remarked that

national security measures are not supposed to be used as "leverage" 88
even though the United States representatives "were quite explicit
that that was the intention." 89 Furthermore, now that the USMCA had
been signed, Freeland targeted Ross's original justification for
imposing the tariffs (i.e., delayed negotiations): "How can that be

relevant today when it comes to Canada? The deal is done. No more

leverage is needed . .. we really think this is groundless."9 0
A critical point for Canada was on August 27, 2018, when the
United States and Mexico reached a bilateral trade agreement in
principle. This diminished Canada's bargaining position as it was now

83.
Rachel Brewster, Analyzing the Trump Administration's InternationalTrade
Strategy, 42 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 1419, 1428 (2019).
84.
See Janyce McGregor, NAFTA talks forced Canada to pick a side in U.S.
China
trade
war,
CBC
NEWS
(Oct.
13,
2018,
4:00
AM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/usmca-canada-china-coalition-1.4855868
[https://perma.cc/5F79-MCJY] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
85.
Katiana Krawchenko, Trump Administration imposes tariffs on steel and
aluminum imports from Europe, Canada and Mexico, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2018, 2:16
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-administration-imposes-tariffs-on-steelaluminum-imports-from-europe-canada-mexico/
[https://perma.cc/Y4XM-XDMV]

(archived Aug. 18, 2020).
86.
Mike Blanchfield, U.S. no longer needs 'improper'metal tariffs as negotiating
tactic:
Freeland,
THE
STAR
(Apr.
4,
2019),
https://www.thestar.comlbusiness/2019/04/04/us-no-longer-needs-improper-metaltariffs-as-negotiating-tactic-freeland.html [https://perma.cc/5ENF-6C83] (archived Sept.
18, 2020).
Id.
87.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
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in danger of being left out of the trade deal. 91 Canada immediately
92
entered into negotiations again while President Trump implied the

United States was willing to sign an agreement with Mexico without
Canada. 93 Ultimately, Canada did sign the USMCA on November 30,
2018.94
The Canadian Government downplayed the significance of the
Poison Pill. Chrystia Freeland, Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister,
indicated that members of the USMCA could already withdraw from
of the Poison Pill95 while other perspectives

the USMCA regardless

included the view that the Poison Pill served to limit Canada's
sovereignty. 96 Peter MacKay (who formerly served as Canada's
Foreign Minister) poignantly commented that the United States had

exerted a great deal of coercive pressure on Canada. 9 7 It was clear, to
the Chinese Government, that the Poison Pill was directed specifically
at China. Shortly after the Poison Pill became public knowledge, the
Chinese Embassy in Canada released a statement in response to the
United States' insistence for the inclusion of the Poison Pill. Although
the statement did not specifically name the United States, it stated:
"We deplore the hegemonic actions taken by some country, which
98
The hard
blatantly interferes with other country's sovereignty."
feelings have not been exclusively directed at the United States. When
the USMCA was signed, it was Mexican President Enrique Pena

Nieto's last day in office. 99 He was succeeded by Andres Manuel Lopez

See Ana Swanson, Katie Rogers & Alan Rappeport, Trump Reaches Revised
91.
Trade Deal with Mexico, Threateningto Leave Out Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/us/politics/us-mexico-nafta-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/XE5F-YD46] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
92.
See Tapp, supra note 80.
See Swanson, Rogers & Rappeport, supra note 91.
93.
See Kristy Kirkup, Canadasigns USMCA despite unresolved steel, aluminum
94.
tariffs
issue,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Nov.
30,
2018),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-trudeau-trump-and-pena-nieto-signusmca-on-sidelines-of-g20-summit/ [https://perma.cc/J5BB-GXXL] (archived Aug. 18,
2020).
See Elise von Sheel, 'They're wrong": Freeland rejects claim USMCA ties
95.
Canada's hands on
trade, CBC
NEWS
(Oct.
20,
2018,
4:00
AM),
eeland-usmca-china-trump-1.4868736
https://www.cbe.ca/news/politics/fr
[https://perma.cc/46HB-RBJ9] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("Freeland said that ability to
trigger a six-month withdrawal period without cause is nothing new, since it was in the
original NAFTA deal.").
See id.; see also Josh Wingrove, supra note 5.
96.
See id. quoting Peter MacKay as saying "I don't think the gun was necessarily
97.
to our head - it was in our mouth, with the trigger cocked and a full chamber.").
98. Yundong, supranote 9.
See Mike Blanchfield, Mexico threw Canada 'under the bus' with bilateral
99.
trade deal with U.S., Liberal MP tells Mexican minister, FIN. POST (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/mexico-threw-canada-under-the-bus-

liberal-mp-tells-mexican-minister
2020).

[https://perma.cc/KGE8-VE87]

(archived Aug.

18,
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Obrador.1 00 When Canada sent a delegation to Mexico, Bob Nault
(head of the Canadian ParlAmericas Chapter) expressed his
dissatisfaction with Mexico's actions during the USMCA
negotiations.

10 1 In particular, his comments indicated frustration with

Mexico abandoning a trilateral agreement and negotiating a bilateral
agreement with the United States-remarking "that Canada got
thrown under the bus by Mexico." 102

2. Poison Pill as Cautionary Tale to Other Nations
Canada is an economically affluent nation. According to the World
Bank, Canada ranks tenth out of 184 countries in terms of GDP.' 0 3 The

fact that Canada felt great pressure to sign the USMCA is therefore
significant. Despite Canada's high economic ranking, the pertinent

issue is that it was negotiating with the United States (ranked first by
the World Bank in terms of GDP).1 04 In addition to the United States'
wealth, the United States is Canada's largest trading partner with
75.02 percent of Canadian exports destined for the United States.1 05
Also note that Mexico (ranked fifteenth out of 184 countries in
terms of GDP)1 06 is also heavily reliant upon trade with the United

States-with exports to the United States comprising 76.49 percent of
Mexico's export market in 2018.107 Although Canada and Mexico were
the largest export markets for the United States, Canada represented

only 18 percent of the US export market and Mexico represented 15.94
percent.1 0 8 Thus, even when Canada and Mexico are combined, they
collectively represent only about 34 percent of the United States' export
market-while the United States represents approximately three-

quarters of each of their respective markets.

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. GDP (current US$) - World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National
Accounts
data
files,
WORLD
DEV.
INDICATORS,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. CD?mostrecentvaluedesc=true
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020) [https://perma.c/R64H-UTWR] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
104. Id.
105. Trade Summary for Canada 2018, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL.,
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CAN
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/HJG2-WJU3] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Trade Summary
for Canada].
106. Id.
107.

Trade Summary for

Mexico 2018,

WORLD

INTEGRATED

TRADE

SOL.,

https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/MEX
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3AB5-XHXN] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Trade Summary for
Mexico].
108. Trade Summary for United States 2018, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL.,
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cd/25EQ-4U73] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
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Canada could have obtained better negotiating leverage if the
USMCA negotiations had proceeded in a truly multilateral fashion.
This was curtailed when Mexico and the United States agreed in
principle on a bilateral agreement. From a Mexican perspective, the
Canadian export market represented only 3.12 percent of Mexican
exports1 09 so an agreement with Canada was not nearly as critical as

an agreement with the United States. Despite Canada and Mexico
being relatively affluent nations, what was ultimately decisive was

their relative bargaining power compared to the United States.
During the USMCA negotiations, the hardline position taken by

the United States did remind Canada about its overreliance on US
trade and the need to diversify its trading relationships.1

0

Even before

the USMCA negotiations, the 2018 Canadian Federal Budget had
already allocated $75 million (over five years) for the development of

1
trade in China and Asia generally." Canada's focus on China is not
surprising given that China is Canada's second largest country trading

partner, second only to the United States." 2 In addition, Canada has
Chinese languages
a vibrant Chinese-immigrant community.
(including Mandarin and Cantonese) collectively are the third most

spoken in Canada-surpassed only by English and French, the official
languages of Canada.1"3 Canada has a long history of good relations
with China extending from the legacy of Dr. Norman Bethune (a
Canadian surgeon regarded as a hero in China who died while saving

Trade Summary for Mexico, supra note 107.
Stephen Tapp & Andrew DiCapua, The drive to diversify, EXPoRTWISE, (Aug.
https://www.edc.ca/en/blog/the-drive-to-diversify.html
2018),
23,
[https://perma.cc/K45U-57U5] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (commenting that "[e]conomists
and politicians have long advocated the need to diversify Canada's international trade
and investment to avoid overreliance on the U.S. market"); see also Tiff Macklem, The
urgent need for Canada to diversify its trade, CONVERSATION (Nov. 13, 2018, 6:23 PM),
http://theconversation.com/the-urgent-need-for-canada-to-diversify-its-trade -106244
[https://perma.cc/PM4Y-UN9Y] (archived Aug. 18, 2020); Glen Hodgson, The difficult
road
to
trade
diversification,
GLOBE
& MAIL,
(
Aug.
31,
2018),
https://www.theglobeandmail.comfbusiness/commentary/article-the-difficult-road-totrade-diversification/ [https://perma.cc/V8Z2-SSCJ] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
111. Government of Canada, Equality & Growth: A Strong Middle Class 67 (2018),
[https://perma.cc/RHL9https://www.budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/plan/budget-2018-en.pdf
WM6V] (archived Aug. 18., 2020) (discussing Canada's plan to expand trade in China
and Asia).
112. Annual Merchandise Trade - Canada's Merchandise Exports, GLOB. AFF.
https://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/statisticsCAN.,
statistiques/annual_merchandise-trade(last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
commerce-des-marchandises-annuel.aspx?lang-eng
[https://perma.cc/49HZ-EBLY] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (ranking China as the 2nd
largest export country for Canadian merchandise).
113. Population: Table 3 - Population by mother tongue selected languages, 0STAT.
CAN. 2018, (Mar. 27, 2018), https://wwwl50.statan.gc.ca/n/pub/12-581-x/201800 /popeng.htm [https://perma.cc/MB4E-B94U] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
109.
110.
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Chinese lives during the Communist Revolution) 114 to Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau leading Canada to be the first Western nation (since
before the Korean War) to officially recognize the People's Republic of
China. 115
Despite Canada's long-term aspirations of a Canada-China free
trade agreement, the Poison Pill was an undesirable provision that

Canada nevertheless had to accept. Mexico was already prepared to
enter into an agreement without Canada, and Canada's discussions
with China about a comprehensive free trade agreement were still in a
very preliminary exploratory phase. 1 16 When the United States was
able to negotiate a bilateral agreement in principle with Mexico,
Canada faced the threat of being excluded from any trade deal. Given
Canada's overdependency on US trade, in hindsight it seems a foregone
conclusion that Canada would have to reluctantly accept the insertion

of the Poison Pill into the USMCA.
The ability of the United States to impose the Poison Pill on

Canada, a resource-rich nation, should worry less economically
affluent nations about the types of trade restrictions that may be
dictated to them by the United States in the future. This amplifies
Caruso's concern about nations (particularly developing nations)
suffering from the externalities of being excluded from important

114. See Press Release, Parks Agency Canada,: The Government of Canada
recognizes the national historic significance of Norman Bethune (1890-1939), (June 13,
2018) https://www.canada.ca/en/parks-canada/news/2018/06/the-government-of-canada-

recognizes-the-national-historic-significance-of-norman-bethune-1890-1939.html
[https://perma.cc/JXU3-GGAJ] (archived Sept. 30, 2020) ("Dr. Norman Bethune is
revered by the Chinese ... due to his courage and medical innovations is considered a role
model by Chinese society."); see also Chinese still cherish memory of Norman Bethune,
PEOPLE'S

DAILY

ONLINE

(Dec.

23,

2004),

http://en.people.cn/200412/23/eng20041223_168381.html [https://perma.cc/RB3J-SZF7]
(archived Aug. 18, 2020) (discussing Dr. Norman Bethune's legacy in China).
115. See Jeremey Kinsman, Why Canada matters to China, IPOLITICS, (Aug. 20,
2016,
10:00
AM),
https://ipolities.ca/2016/08/20/why-canada-matters-to-chinal
[https:/perma.cc/4V8A-T3FP] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("Few Americans realize,
however, that when President Richard Nixon went to China in the spring of 1972, he
was following a trail blazed by a Canadian prime minister. Pierre Trudeau had already

broken the ice in Beijing. Canada was the first Western country since before the Korean
War to recognize the regime that won power in 1949 as the rightful government of
China."); see also Nathan VanderKlippe, Pierre Trudeau's China legacy looms large
ahead of PM's first official visit, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 29,
2016),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pierre-trudeaus-china-legacy-loomsahead-of-pms-first-official-visit/article31592099/
[https://perma.c/4BPY-YX62]
(archived Aug. 18, 2020).
116. Canada had only commenced seeking public consultation on a potential
Canada - China FTA in 2017. See Consulting Canadians on a possible Canada-China
free trade agreement, GOVT CAN. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/consultations/china-chine/index.aspx?lang-eng
[https://perma.cc/9NVLZK36] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
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FTAs.1"7 The Poison Pill could be used to coerce a developing nation
into excluding itself from the possibility of entering into FTAs it would
otherwise have desired. Even affluent nations such as the United
Kingdom face the possibility of coercion. In the wake of Brexit, the
United Kingdom has been discussing the possibility of a trade
agreement with the United States.1 18 Yet, it has been reported that the
United States wishes to impose restrictions like the Poison Pill into the
proposed US-UK trade agreement. 119 As expected, this has prompted
scrutiny from the Labour Party (the official opposition party in the UK)

20
over
about the United Kingdom maintaining "sovereignty"
important decisions such as whether or not to engage in trade with
China.
From a broader international trade perspective, the Poison Pill is
also troubling because it violates the WTO Agreement (argued in Part
III below) and contributes further to the US-led erosion of the WTO

(argued in Part IV below).

III. POISON PILL-THE WTO CONTEXT

A. The Poison Pill Violates the WTO Agreement
A plain-reading analysis of the relevant provisions of the WTO
Agreement reveals that the Poison Pill violates both the text and spirit
of the WTO Agreement's provisions on equal treatment among
members and the acceptable formation of FTAs. A review of the leading
WTO case on customs unions and FTAs confirms that the Poison Pill
violates the WTO Agreement.

117. Caruso, supra note 18, at 430 ("A free-for-all, neoliberal embrace of
bilateralism or regionalism might exacerbate global wealth asymmetries rather than
cure them.").
118. See Trade Talks between UK and US set to get under way, BBC NEWS (May
4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-52528821 [https://perma.cc/SR8E-S8XZ]
(archived Aug. 18, 2020).
119. See id. ("Washington has also indicated that it wants to be able to veto the
UK's ability to strike deals with 'non-market economies,' amid growing US tensions with
China.").
120. See Lewis McKenzie, Sophie Morris, Elizabeth Arnold & George Ryan,
Labour warns US may try to block future trade deal with China, (May 12, 2020, 11:55
AM), BELFAST TELEGRAPH, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/uk/labour-warns-

us-may-try-to-block-future-trade-deal-with-china-39199896.html
[https://perma.c/W77F-CHRW] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
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1. Textual Analysis: MFN and the Exception for FTAs
Founded in 1995, the WTO is regarded as the preeminent
international trade body.12 1 Its legacy can be traced back to the 1948
inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The WTO's

membership consists of 164 nations as of 2016 and it incorporates the
GATT (as modified in 1994).122 The WTO promotes trade through two
key

GATT

treatment.

12 4

provisions:

(1)

MFN12 3

treatment

and (2)

National

Together these two provisions attempt to ensure that

WTO members provide equality of treatment to each other. MFN

treatment's importance is borne out of the fact that it is the very first
provision of GATT. MFN treatment requires that any advantageous
tariff or quota provided by a WTO member to any nation must also be
provided to all WTO members on an equal basis.1 25 Essentially MFN
treatment prohibits WTO members from discriminating amongst each
other with respect to trade barriers.1 2 6 Once goods have entered a WTO
member's country, National Treatment requires that a WTO member
must treat the goods of other WTO members no differently than it

treats domestic goods.12 7
At first glance, FTAs such as NAFTA appear to be a breach of
MFN treatment. Under NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and
Mexico provide each other preferential treatment (including with

121. According to the WTO: "The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only
global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nation." See
What
is
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited July 5, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/P74J-Q3YS] (archived Aug. 18, 2020); see also Cathleen D. CiminoIsaacs, Ian F. Fergusson & Rachel F. Fefer, World Trade Organization: Overview and
Future
Direction,
CONG.
RES.
SERV.,
R45417
37
(2019)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45417.pdf [https://perma.ccfH6FX-8Z4N] (archived Aug. 18,
2020) (referring to the WTO as the "preeminent global trade institution"); Bryce
Baschuk, What's Next for the WTO After Sabotage by the U.S., WASH. POST (Dec. 11,
2019, 6:03 AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/whats-next-for-the-wto-aftersabotage-by-the-us/2019/12/11/db45de8e-lbd3-1lea-977a-15a6710ed6da_story.html
[https://perma.cc/D64L-VM6Y] (archived Aug. 18, 2020)(referring to the WTO appellate
body as the "preeminent forum for settling worldwide trade disagreements").
122.

See WORLD TRADE ORG. Members and Observers, supra note 13.

123. GATT, supra note 14, art. I.
124. Id. art. III.
125. Id. art. I.
126. Id. art. I, ¶ 1 (stating that "...any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.").
127. Id. art. III, ¶ 1 (stating that "[internal taxes and law affecting internal
trade]... should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production."); id. art. III, ¶ 2 ("The products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.").
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128
respect to tariffs) that they do not provide to other WTO members.

However, there is an important exception to MFN treatment under
GATT Article XXIV which permits the establishment of custom unions

and FTAs.1 29 An FTA refers to an agreement between two or more
WTO members where trade restrictions such as tariffs have been

eliminated on "substantially all the trade"1 30 in goods between those
WTO members. A customs union is much like an FTA except that it

also applies a common tariff against all WTO members that are not
part of the customs union.131 Pursuant to GATT Article XXIV, the
WTO allows this exception to MFN treatment under the belief that the
formation of free trade areas and customs unions will benefit
liberalized trade on the whole and may contribute to a future with truly

free trade amongst all WTO members. 132 Therefore, Article XXIV (4)
makes clear that promoting free trade is to be the purpose of the FTA
or customs union and "not to raise barriers to the trade of other
3
contracting parties with such territories."1 3 This exception for FTAs
34
requires that the "duties and other regulations of commerce"1 applied
to WTO members (who are not part of the FTA or customs union) shall

not be higher or more restrictive than those existing prior to the

128. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)- Rules of Origin, GOV'T
https://www.international.ge.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordsCAN.
commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/fta-ale/tech-rect.aspx?lang=eng (last visited July 5,
2020) [https://perma.cc/68K3-623Z] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("Each NAFTA country
retains its external tariffs vis-A-vis non-members' goods and levies a lower tariff on the
goods "originating" from the other NAFTA members.").
129. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV.
130. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 8(b) ("A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group
of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations
of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories.").
131. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 8(a)(iii) (stating that with respect custom unions
"...substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each
of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union.").
132. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). The preamble makes reference to free
trade and customs unions stating "Recognizingthe contribution to the expansion of world
trade that may be made by closer integration between the economies of the parties to
such agreements; Recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the elimination
between the constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded;
Reaffirming the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such
territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should to the
greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other Members...."
(emphasis in original). Id. pmbl.
133. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 4.
134. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 5(a).
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formation of the FTA or customs union. 13 5 Assuming this condition is
met, GATT does not prevent the formation of an FTA or customs
union, 13 6 thus carving these territories out as exceptions to MFN
treatment.

The Poison Pill contradicts Article XXIV's central premise because
it may be used to deter USMCA signatories from entering into FTAs
with other WTO members. The Poison Pill draws its power from the
threat to withhold (via expulsion) preferential trading benefits from a
USMCA member if that member engages in an FTA with a non-market
country. Yet, those very same preferential benefits exist only due to an
exception. That exception's foundational premise is that the FTA will
only be used to promote trade among members and not raise barriers
to other WTO members. Via the Poison Pill, the USMCA uses

preferential trading benefits in a manner that directly contradicts the
raison d'etre of the very provision it relies upon for the existence of
those benefits.

2. Application of WTO Jurisprudence: The Turkey-Textiles Case
Although Article XXIV provides the foundation for the formation
of the myriad FTAs (including bilateral trade agreements) around the

world, there have been comparatively few WTO decisions dealing with
Article XXIV.13 7 The most relevant decision is Turkey-Textiles-a
1999 decision of the WTO Appellate Body. 138 In 1996, Turkey imposed

quotas on Indian textiles shortly after Turkey entered into a customs
union with the EC.139 India argued that these quotas violated GATT
article XIII (nondiscriminatory administration of quantitative
restrictions) while Turkey replied that the quotas were justified under

GATT Article XXIV (regarding FTAs and customs unions).1 4 0 A WTO

135. Id.
136. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 5 (Assuming that the condition is met, this section states
"...the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the
adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area.").

137.

See WTO Analytical Index - GATT 1994 - Article XXIV (Jurisprudence),
TRADE
ORG,
(last
https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/publications-e/ail7_e/gatt1994_art24_jur.pdf
visited Sept. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UWW3-HVDZ] (archived Sept. 18, 2020). A
review of the WTO Analytical Index on Article XXIV (current as of June, 2020) published
WORLD

by the WTO reveals that much of the discussion revolves around a single case between

Turkey and India. See infra note 138.
138. Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
Turkey-Textiles], appealing Panel Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile
and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R (adopted May 31, 1999) [hereinafter
Turkey-Textiles Panel Report].
139. See Turkey-Textiles, supra note 138, ¶ 2.
140. Id. 1 3.
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panel ruled in favor of India, and Turkey appealed the decision to the
WTO Appellate Body. 14 1
142
Turkey
The WTO Appellate Body adjudicated the appeal.
stated that it was required to impose the quotas against India so that

143
regarding
it would have "substantially the same commercial policy"

textiles as the rest of the European Communities. According to Turkey,
this brought its situation under the scope of Article XXIV as part of a
customs union and justified derogation from GATT principles such as

MFN treatment and Article XIII. 144 The Appellate Body rejected
Turkey's argument, stating that Article XXIV did not permit Turkey to
impose the quotas against India even though Turkey was part of a
14 5
customs union.

In coming to its ruling, the Appellate Body closely analyzed
Article XXIV and made two important points that are relevant to the

Poison Pill. First, the Appellate Body stated that Article XXIV must be
interpreted in light of paragraph 4:
According to paragraph 4, the purpose of a customs union is to "facilitate trade"
between the constituent members and "not to raise barriers to trade" with third
countries. This objective demands that a balance be struck by the constituent
members of a customs union. A customs union should facilitate trade within the
customs union, but it should not do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with
third countries . . . . Thus the purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other
relevant paragraphs of Article XXIV, including the chapeau of paragraph 5 ....
The chapeau cannot be interpreted correctly without constant reference to this
purpose.146

In other words, Article XXIV permits the formation of FTAs and
customs unions in order to facilitate trade internally among their
members and may be used as a defense against the accusation that it
has violated MFN treatment. However, Article XXIV is not permitted
to be used offensively as a weapon-it may not be used to raise barriers

to trade with third countries.
Second, the Appellate Body articulated two conditions that must
be met if a nation is to effectively raise Article XXIV as a defense. The
first condition is that both paragraphs 5(a) and 8(a) have been

141. See id. ¶ 1.
142. See id.
143. Id. ¶ 2.
144. Id. ¶ 8.
145. Id. ¶ 64 (stating that the Appellate Body "...upholds the Panel's conclusion
that Article XXIV does not allow Turkey to adopt, upon the formation of a customs union
with the European Communities, quantitative restrictions on imports of 19 categories of
textile and clothing products which were found to be inconsistent with Articles XI and
XIII of the GATT 1994....").
146. Id. ¶ 57.
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satisfied. 14 7 Generally, under paragraph 5 the customs union or FTA's
duties and regulations of commerce imposed on parties (who are not
members of the customs union or FTA) shall not on the whole be higher

or more restrictive than prior to the formation of the customs union or
FTA.1 4 8 Under paragraph 8(a) the customs union must eliminate
substantially all duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
amongst its members.1 49

The second condition is that the "party must demonstrate that the
formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not
allowed to introduce the measure at issue."1 5 0 The Appellate Body

emphasized: "Again, both these conditions must be met to have the
benefit of the defence under Article XXIV."151
Upon applying these principles in Turkey-Textiles,

the

Appellate Body found that the second condition was not met, stating
that Turkey did not have to impose quotas in order to form part of the
customs union.1 52 It reviewed paragraph 8 (a)(ii) meticulously and
noted that:
[S]ub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) does not require each constituent member of a customs
union to apply the same duties and other regulations of commerce as other

constituent members with respect to trade with third countries; instead it
requires that substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce
53
shall be applied.1

This interpretation of subparagraph 8(a)(ii) provides a certain
degree of "flexibility" 154 in meeting the requirements of Article XXIV.

It also buttressed the Appellate Body's reasoning-it concluded that
Turkey did have alternatives that it could have used instead of
imposing quotas on India.1 55 Turkey could have established a system
using rules of origin certificates which would allow members of the
customs union to differentiate between textiles originating in India

147. Id. ¶ 58 ("First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must
demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs
union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article
XXIV.").
148. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV, ¶ 5.
149. Id. ¶ 8(a).
150. Turkey-Textiles, supra note 138, ¶ 58.
151. Id.
152. Id. ¶ 63 ("For this reason, we conclude that Turkey was not, in fact, required
to apply the quantitative restrictions at issue in this appeal in order to form a customs
union with the European Communities.").

153. Id. ¶49.
154. Id. 150. However, the Appellate Body did emphasize that this was qualified
by the word "same" ensuring that the floodgates would not open too widely: "Here too we
would caution that this 'flexibility' is limited. It must not be forgotten that the word
'substantially' qualifies the words 'the same."' See id.
155. Id. ¶62.
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from those originating in Turkey. 15 6 On this basis, the Appellate Body
ruled that Turkey had not met the second condition of the test and,
157
therefore, the imposed quotas were not saved under Article XXIV.
Although Turkey-Textiles dealt specifically with a customs

union, there are two overarching principles in that case which may be

readily applied to an FTA such as the USMCA. The first principle is
the general interpretive approach found in paragraph 4 that states the
15 8
FTA must not create barriers to trade with third countries.

Paragraph 4 clearly states that it applies to both customs unions and
FTAs. 15 9 Applying this principle to the Poison Pill suggests that the
Poison Pill contradicts Article XXIV. The Poison Pill is clearly intended
to deter or punish (with expulsion) any member that enters into an
FTA with a non-market country (even another WTO member). This is

a barrier to trade with third countries-founded on a threat of
expulsion from an FTA. China, which is a WTO member, clearly
understood this to be a barrier which is exactly why it denounced the
160
Poison Pill shortly after its announcement.
The second relevant principle from Turkey-Textiles is that the
measure complained of must have been necessary for the formation of
the customs union. This principle is also applicable to FTAs. It follows
as a logical consequence of the general interpretive principle discussed
immediately above. The goal of Article XXIV is to create a trade16 1
liberalizing region which does not raise barriers to third countries.
Under GATT, deviation from MFN treatment is tolerated (under

Article XXIV) on the premise that the FTA or customs union will on
the whole liberalize trade in that region.1 6 2 As part of that trade-off,
any measure that may negatively affect trade with third countries,

156. Id.
157. Id. ¶63 ("For this reason, we conclude that Turkey was not, in fact, required
to apply the quantitative restrictions at issue in this appeal in order to form a customs
union with the European Communities. Therefore, Turkey has not fulfilled the second of
the two necessary conditions that must be fulfilled to be entitled to the benefit of the
defence under Article XXIV.").
158. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV, 1 4.
159. Id. (referring to both a "customs union or a free-trade area").
160. See Yundong, supra note 9 (referring to the Poison Pill as "trade restricting
actions against China").
161. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV, 1 5(b) (stating "with respect to a freetrade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free-trade area, the
duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such
interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not
parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories
prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may
be....").
162. See id. art. XXIV, ¶ 4 ("The contracting parties recognize the desirability of
increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.").
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even if it complied with the first condition, must be shown to be
necessary for the formation of the trade-liberalizing region.
The Poison Pill does not satisfy this second principle. There is no
reason why the Poison Pill's inclusion into the USMCA was necessary
for the USMCA's formation. Far from being a trade-liberalizing

provision to solely promote trade, the Poison Pill's goal is to dissuade
the formation of trade-liberalizing FTAs with select third countries.
NAFTA, as the predecessor to the USMCA, has been in existence since
1994163 and it contains nothing remotely similar to the Poison Pill. The
USMCA is substantively similar to NAFTA 164 although there are some
differences. 165 Therefore, NAFTA is solid evidence that the FTA
contemplated by the USMCA does not functionally depend upon the
Poison Pill's inclusion.
In summary, the Poison Pill is not permitted under Article XXIV.
In order to be permitted under Article XXIV it must satisfy two
conditions. It does not satisfy either condition because it raises trade
barriers to third countries and is not necessary for the establishment

of the FTA. Although the USMCA is an agreement between only three
countries, the WTO Agreement is between 164 countries including not
only the United States, Canada and Mexico but also parties that may
be affected by the Poison Pill-most notably, China. While it is true

that no country is entitled to have an FTA with the United States, it is
also true that no country is entitled to be a WTO member on its own
terms. Although the WTO does not require any country to form an FTA,
the WTO it is entitled to require that the voluntary formation of an

FTA be done solely in accordance with WTO terms as a condition of
WTO membership. The three USMCA countries cannot unilaterally
amend the WTO Agreement to their liking.166

163. See NAFTA, supra note 26.
164. See Daniel Ikenson, USMCA: A Marginal NAFTA Upgrade at a High Cost,
CATO INST. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/usmcamarginal-nafta-upgrade-high-cost [https://perma.cc/Q7V9-HVKR] (archived July 20,
2020) (stating "The USMCA is a marginal improvement over NAFTA-better in some
areas, worse in others, about the same in most."); see also Gary Hufbauer and Steven
Globerman, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Overview and Outlook,
FRASER
RES.
BULLETIN
1
(Nov.
2018),
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/us-mexico-canada-agreement-

overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RR3-4E7G] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("Notwithstanding
President Trump's characterization of NAFTA as the worst trade deal ever signed by the
USMCA, the USMCA doesn't create much change.").
165. See Terence Stewart & Shahrzad Noorbaloochi, The USMCA & United States
- Canada Trade Relations: The Perspective of a U.S. Trade Practitioner,43 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 280 (2019) (reviewing the differences between NAFTA and the USMCA).
166. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 13, art. X (generally outlining the
procedure for amendments to the GATT with thresholds ranging from two-thirds to
three-fourths and unanimous acceptance of members depending on the issue).
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B. How the PoisonPill Derives Its Power from the WTO Agreement
The Poison Pill paradoxically derives a significant amount of its

coercive strength from the WTO Agreement itself. This is an important
observation when responding to an anticipated criticism that the WTO
should not interfere in voluntarily negotiated agreements between
sovereign nations. That criticism would implicitly assume that the
state of negotiations between the countries is not already affected by
the WTO. When WTO members voluntary negotiate an FTA, they do
so under the shadow of the WTO Agreement. This normative baseline
includes the MFN rule and the exception for FTAs which limits the

range of options available to the parties. This Part demonstrates how
this preexisting WTO normative baseline is critical in augmenting the

efficacy of the Poison Pill as a trade-restrictive provision.
The coercive effect of normative baselines upon apparently freely
negotiated agreements between parties is a theme that resonates well
with those familiar with American legal realism. Below is a discussion

of two lines of case law from the early 1900s involving the concept of
freedom of contract and resulting in either the courts or legislature
imposing limits on contracts. This discussion is intended to provide

historical context for the subsequent analysis of Robert Lee Hale's
influential contribution to American legal realism and its relevance to

the Poison Pill. Hale, educated as a lawyer and an economist, was a
professor at Columbia Law School from 1919 to 1949.167 He was a
scholar in the Legal Realist tradition and he is well-known for his work
on property rights and coercion, with a particular emphasis on how
68
legal rules contribute to distribution in society.1

1. Limits to Freedom of Contract: Classic American Jurisprudence
Hale's insights were published during the early twentieth century
when the limits of freedom of contract under a seemingly laissez-faire
society were being debated in American courts and legislatures. The

two lines of cases below exemplify this era's intellectual battle and
situate Hale's relevancy to that debate.
69
remains a landmark case
The case of Lochner v. New York1
70
symbolizing this era's debates.1 In Lochner, the Supreme Court ruled
(in a 5-4 ruling) that a New York statute, which set the maximum

167.

BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT

HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMIcS MOVEMENT 2-3 (2001).
168. Id. at 3.
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
170. See Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) ("But
for more than a half-century, the most important of all defining cases has been Lochner
v. New York. The spectre of Lochner has loomed over most important constitutional
decisions, whether they uphold or invalidate governmental practices." (footnotes
omitted)).
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permissible work hours for bakery employees, was unconstitutional. 171
The Court's reasoning was that it was an unconstitutional interference

with right to freedom of contract. 172
However, in his now famous dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes accused the majority of deciding the case "upon an economic

theory which a large part of the country does not entertain."1 73 Holmes
also demonstrated the inconsistency of the majority ruling by pointing
out that there were plenty of instances where the law permitted
interference with contractual liberty including laws prohibiting usury,
lotteries, and working on Sundays.1 74 Yet, the majority decision would
persist for more than three decades. Finally, in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,175 the Supreme Court held that a Washington State
minimum-wage law was constitutional1 76 implying that "the Court

rejected the theoretical foundations of the Lochner period."1

77

A similarly themed issue is the "yellow-dog contract." Yellow-dog
contracts referred to employment contracts which contained a clause
where the worker agreed that he/she would not join a labor union. 17 8
Again, the issue was whether a prohibition against such a clause would
be an unconstitutional restraint on the liberty to contract. If workers
attempted to organize themselves against an employer, employers
would rely on these clauses to obtain an injunction.1 79 Moreover, when
courts issued these injunctions, workers harbored resentment from "a
feeling that the courts are not neutral . . . . To labor, this seems an
alignment of government with the anti-union employers."1 80 In 1915,

the Supreme Court ruled that a Kansas law prohibiting yellow-dog
contracts was unconstitutional.181 However, by 1932, the NorrisLaGuardia Act was enacted and stated that yellow-dog contracts were

171. See id. at 877.
172. Id.
173. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
174. Id. ("The other day, we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination
law. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11. United States and state statutes and
decisions cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination are familiar to this
court. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197. Two years ago, we upheld
the prohibition of sales of stock on margins or for future delivery in the constitution of
California. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606. The decision sustaining an eight hour law for
miners is still recent. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366.").
175. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
176. See Sunstein, supranote 170, at 876 (referring to West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
as the "...case generally thought to spell the down fall of Lochner.").
177. Id. at 880.
178. For a critique of the yellow dog contract, see Cornelius Cochrane, Why
Organized Labor is Fighting Yellow Dog Contracts, 15 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 227, 232
(1925) ("It deems such a weapon unfair - a weapon that the emiployer has resorted to by
subterfuge and has justified by the old rules of the common law - because he has no
better justification .... ").
179. Edwin E. Witte, Yellow Dog Contracts,6 WIS. L. REv., 21, 22 (1930).
180. Id. at 28.
181. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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unenforceable. 182 Similarly, the Wagner Act also prohibited yellow-dog
contracts,1 8 3 and the constitutionality of this statute was upheld by the
Supreme Court in 1937.184 Cushman has noted that "[t]he yellow-dog
contract provoked something of a crisis in liberal discourse, because it
brought into conflict two time-honored liberal values: liberty of
185
contract and freedom of association."

2. Robert Hale's Powerful Insight: Coercive Power and Normative

Baselines
The two lines of cases discussed above spanned the early 1900s to
the 1930s. It was during this time that Hale's work found intellectual

traction. Lochner reflected the pervasive theme found in this era's
laissez-faire ideology: that the government should not interfere with

6
contracts made by consenting individuals.18 Yet if it could be shown
that the baseline bargaining position of individuals was already

fashioned by the government and that this baseline would have an

effect on the outcome of contractual negotiations, then the case for
government intervention in the acceptable limits of freedom of contract
1 87
It is exactly with respect to this point that
would be much stronger.

Hale offers his insight.1 88
In his seminal article, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly

Non-Coercive State,"189 Hale elegantly described how the law imbues

182. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1932).
183. 29 U.S.C § 158 (1974) (stating that it is prohibited to "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization").
184. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
185. Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas: The Case of the
Yellow-Dog Contract, SUP. CT. REV. 235, 236 (1992).
186. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain...a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire.").
187. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, 99-100 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz
& Thomas A. Redd eds., 1993) ("All economic and social activity is organized by an
elaborate network of legal rules. Those rules confer advantages on certain parties and
disadvantages on others. Social reform statutes-such as consumer protection laws,
guarantees of collective bargaining rights, or laws limiting the number of hours
employees can be required to work-thus represent adjustment of the legal ground rules,
designed in part to alter the relative advantages of different groups of actors ratherthan
intrusions into a sphere in which formerly it had no role.").
188. FRIED, supra note 167, at 205 (noting that Hale focused on "coercion, property
rights and public utility regulation" and that "His argument in all three areas is best
read as an elaborated response to the particular version of laissez fair ascendant in turn-

of-the century politics and briefly enshrined in constitutional law by the Lochner-era
Court.").

189. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
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individuals with the ability to exert coercive force on each other
through the law's enforcement of property rights. 190 He hypothesizes

the plight of a worker who has no food. 19 1 Those who own food are
under no legal obligation to provide the worker food and the law of
property prohibits the worker from simply taking food-owner's food. 19 2
Hale states: "Unless the non-owner can produce his own food, the law
compels him to starve if he has no wages, and compels him to go

without wages unless he obeys the behest of some employer."1

93

In

addition, this worker cannot grow food unless the worker can use
land.1 94 If worker owns no land, then the worker won't be able to use

the land unless the worker pays the land owner. 195 The worker could
try to produce goods and sell the goods but the worker cannot do so if
the worker does not own the machinery for making goods.1 96
Note that in each case, the worker's dilemma is related to property
law-the worker does not own food, does not own property to grow food,
nor does the worker own the machinery to allow the worker to produce

goods to sell for money (in order to buy food). 197 What the worker does
have is the worker's own capacity for labor. Thus, Hale concludes: "It
is the law of property which coerces people into working for factory
owners-though, as we shall see shortly, the workers can as a rule
exert sufficient counter-coercion to limit materially the governing

power of owners."1 9 8
Hale's insight into this seemingly simple situation is powerful. He
demonstrated that voluntary contracts involving the exchange of
property (including trading property for labor as in an employment

contract), involved the coercive force of the government. This is because
property rights (including the right to exclude others from the
property) are creations of the government and often form the basis of
the bargaining between parties. 199 It is important to note that Hale
was not suggesting that property rights or coercive power were

190. FRIED, supra note 167, at 17 ("Moreover, such private coercion derived its
force from public power in the form of a legally created right to withhold property or
services from exchange entirely, and the lesser included right to retain whatever price

one could extract for agreeing to relinquish that right.").
191. Hale, supranote 189, at 472. In this particular case, he hypothesizes a worker
who wants to eat a bag of peanuts. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 473.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 472-73.
198. See id.
199. See Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927)
("The character of property as sovereign power compelling service and obedience may be
obscured for us in a commercial economy by the fiction of the so-called labor contract as
a free bargain...there is actually little freedom to bargain on the part of the steel worker
or miner who needs a job.").
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necessarily undesirable. 2 00 He was simply reminding us that what
appeared to be a purely private agreement between two individuals

actually took place under normative regime of property law created
and enforced by the government. Therefore, to say that contracts
involving property between individuals were an exclusively private
matter and should not involve the government is inaccurate.

201
Government is already involved through its creation of property law.
itselfThe real question is the extent that government should involve
a normative question based on values rather than classical legal

reasoning.
Fried summarizes the implications of Hale's reasoning regarding
these transactions: "That situation meant that when government
intervened in private market relations to curb the use of certain
private bargaining power, it did not inject coercion for the first time into

those relations; it merely changed the relative distribution of coercive
power. 20 2 Duncan Kennedy expresses a similar view where he refers
to the normative baseline of rules as "ground rules." He states:
A basic reason for the invisibility of the distributional consequences of law is that
we don't think of ground rules of permission as ground rules at all, by contrast
with ground rules of prohibition . . .. The invisibility of legal ground rules comes
from the fact that when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing to
203
do with the outcome.

3. Applying Hale's Insights to the Poison Pill

Hale's insights can be applied to an analysis of the Poison Pill
within the broader context of the WTO Agreement. While WTO

members cannot call upon the coercive power of the state as in the case
of a civil dispute under domestic law of a nation, Hale's insights are

still useful because the WTO Agreement is a system of normative rules
which its members acknowledge as being legitimate through their

acquiescence to its terms. All 164 member nations of the WTO engage
in international trade under the normative umbrella of the WTO

200. See Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, MoD. L. REV.
421, 435 (1990); see also Cohen, supra note 199, at 14 ("...the recognition of private
property as a form of sovereignty is not itself an argument against it. Some form of
government we must always have.").
201. Robert L. Hale, Rate making and the Revision of the Property Concept,
COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922) (With respect to the property owner, Hale stated that:
"The law has delegated to him a discretionary power over the rights and duties of
others.").
202. FRIED, supra note 167, at 18 (emphasis added).
203. Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, LEGAL STUD. F.
327, 333 (1999); see also Sunstein, supra note 170, at 917 (stating that in West Coast
Hotel, the Court adopted "an alternative baseline and rejected Lochner era
understandings of neutrality.").
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Agreement. More importantly, any FTA voluntarily agreed upon by

WTO members takes place in the shadow of MFN treatment as being
a default normative baseline.

Consider the position of Canada under the USMCA. Under the
Poison Pill, Canada faces the unsavory prospect of being expelled from
the USMCA if it enters into an FTA with China. 204 One alternative

would be for Canada to enter into preferential sectoral trade
agreements with China. Canada could reduce or eliminate all tariffs or
quotas on selected Chinese imports. As long as these preferential,
sectoral agreements did not cover "substantially all the trade" between
Canada and China, they would not be considered to be a free trade
agreement under the WTO. 205 Since these would not be an FTA, they
would not trigger the Poison Pill.
Yet, Canada is prohibited from pursuing this option due to its
MFN treatment obligations under the WTO Agreement. 2 06 In a world
without MFN Treatment, Canada could offer China many different

types of preferential tariff treatment in exchange for trade concessions
from China. Under the current WTO regime, it is either all or nothing.
The "all" is to enter into an FTA under GATT Article XXIV such that
the FTA covers substantially all the trade while the "nothing" means
dealing merely on MFN terms. There is no middle ground where WTO
nations can give each other preferential tariff treatment on less than
"substantially all the trade between the two nations" terms. By
threatening Canada with expulsion from the USMCA, the Poison Pill
coerces Canada from the "all" of an FTA with China and leaves it to

the WTO MFN rule to exclude the vast middle ground-effectively
leaving Canada with the "nothing" of dealing with China on solely
MFN terms. It is in this manner that the Poison Pill draws its power
from the WTO Agreement to further its trade-restrictive purpose. This
key observation provides the WTO a normatively justified reason for
curtailing the use of clauses such as the Poison Pill.

IV. THE POISON PILL: EROSION OF WTO PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS

This Part suggests that the Poison Pill exacerbates the existing
concerns that FTAs may divert trade inefficiently. Moreover,
regardless of the Poison Pill's immediate impact on Canada, what is

most concerning are the coercive tactics that the United States used to

204. See USMCA, supra note 1, art. 32.10, 1 5.
205. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV, ¶ 8(i) (states that in order to qualify as
a free trade area the agreement must eliminate tariffs and duties "with respect to
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in
such territories.").
206. See generally GATT, supra note 14, art. I ( titled "General Most-FavouredNation Treatment.").
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ensure that Canada accepted the USMCA (including the Poison Pill).
These tactics were also used to coerce Argentina, Brazil, and South
Korea into providing trade concessions to the United States on an
allegedly voluntary basis even though such voluntary agreements are
prohibited by the WTO. Finally, this Part contemplates two strategies

that middle powers and developing nations can use to mitigate the
effects of trade restrictions like the Poison Pill. It concludes with

observing that the United States, through aggressive trade actions like
the

Poison

Pill,

incentivizes

nations

to

form

coalitions

with

superpowers like China and the EU to counterbalance an increasingly
overreaching United States.
A. PoisonPill as a Trade Diverter
Since MFN treatment is one of the cornerstones of the GATT, it is
remarkable that FTAs (and customs unions) are permitted under the
WTO. FTAs directly contradict the principle of nondiscrimination

because they discriminate between WTO members. Members of an
FTA provide each other with preferential tariff treatment but do not

make this treatment available to WTO members who are not members
of that FTA. 207 This is the reason why Bhagwati prefers the term
"preferential trade area" (PTA). 208 The word "preferential" in the term
PTA reminds us that the members of the PTA are giving each other

preferential treatment-implying that this treatment is to the
exclusion of others. 209
FTAs have been permitted under GATT Article XXIV ever since
GATT was established in 1947.210 Kerry Chase studied the origins of

GATT Article XXIV, a clause that he states has been problematic right
2 11
He notes that according to the prevailing
from the very beginning.
view, the US government allowed FTAs during negotiations of GATT
because "they worried that Britain and developing nations would

abandon the talks, and they wished to remove obstacles for European
integration." 2 12 Surprisingly, Chase's investigation of archival records
uncovered another reason why US officials might have tolerated FTAs.
According to him, the United States wanted to carve an FTA exception

&

207. Jagdish Bhagwati, PreferentialTrade Agreements: The Wrong Road, 27 L.
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 865, 865 (1996).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Spheres of Commerce: The WTO Legal
System and Regional Trading Blocs - A reconsideration,46 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 649,
650 (2018) ("The tension between the between the WTO and PTAs has dogged the
international trading system since its inception in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 1947 and through its institutional transformation in the WTO in 1995.").
211. Kerry Chase, Multilateralism compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT
Article XXIV, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 1, 1 (2006) (remarking that the GATT "...has been a
source of vexation and puzzlement since the treaty's inception in 1947.").

212.

Id. at 2.
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to MFN (i.e., GATT Article XXIV) in order "to accommodate a trade
treaty they had secretly reached with Canada. 2 13
Regardless of the origins of Article XXIV, FTAs have proliferated
greatly in the last 25 years. When the United States, Canada, and

Mexico entered into NAFTA in 1994, there were a cumulative total of
46 RTA notifications to the WTO and a cumulative total of 39 FTAs in

force. 21 4 As of 2019, there were a cumulative total of 480 FTA
notifications to the WTO and a cumulative total of 301 RTAs in force. 215
Given that there are currently 164 WTO members, a total of 301 FTAs
(in force) is a high number considering that Article XXIV is supposed
to be a mere exception to the general rule of MFN. The prevalence of
FTAs suggests that we ought to better understand what influence
FTAs might have on international trade, a topic that continues to be

one of the "most enduring debates in international trade law." 21 6
It is unclear whether FTAs lead to an overall increase in economic

welfare for WTO members. Bhagwati notes that there may be some
officials (as well as the general public) who view "any trade

.

liberalization as good" 2 17 and believe that "even discriminatory
lowering of trade barriers must surely be good as long as trade barriers
were being dismantled." 218 Yet he notes that "increasingly the
sophisticated international economists realized that free trade areas
.. were a mix of free trade and protection." 2 19 Although trade within
the FTA was liberalized by the elimination of trade barriers, the

continued maintenance of those trade barriers (tariffs at MFN rates
for example) represents discrimination or protectionism against the
WTO nations that are not members of the FTA. 220 The overall benefits

of FTAs depend on how trade is ultimately directed. If FTAs tend to
divert trade from the most efficient producers, then this will result in

a negative effect on overall trade. On the other hand, if there is no
diversion from the most efficient producers then there may be a

positive effect. 221

213. Id. at 1.
214. RTA Tracker, WORLD TRADE ORG. REG'L TRADE AGREEMENTS DATABASE,
http://rtais.wto.org/Ul/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4E9Z-L7WQ] (archived July 11, 2020).
215. Id.
216. Howse & Langille, supra note 210, at 650.
217. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: How PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 16 (2008).

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 17 ("So FTAs are two-faced: they free trade among members, but
they increase protection against non-members. This means they are fundamentally
different from free trade.").
221. See Kimberly Ann Elliot, The WTO and regional/bilateraltrade agreements,
in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 17, 22 (Robert E. Looney ed.,

2019) ("The net welfare effects of RTAs are only positive if the trade created among the
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Whether or not FTAs result in inefficient trade diversion has not
been conclusively answered. In its 2011 World Trade Report, the WTO
specifically examined preferential trade agreements and their effects
2 22
In that report, the WTO reviewed the
on international trade.
literature regarding trade diversion and trade creation (trade creation

referring to trade that is not rerouted to less efficient producers as a
result of an FTA). 22 3 The report categorizes the literature into three
broad categories but acknowledges that the "literature is not
conclusive."22 4 It refers to the work of Freund and Ornelas to only

modestly note that the literature "suggests that trade diversion may
play a role in some agreements and some sectors, but it does not
225
emerge as a key effect of preferential agreements."
Given the multitude of variables involved with measuring world

trade on a macro-level, researchers would be hard-pressed to draw any
definitive conclusions about trade diversion. In addition, an evaluation
of any purported FTA trade diversion is based on the premise that one

can confidently estimate the flow of trade in the absence of the FTA.
Therefore, all research on trade diversion is necessarily based on
estimations or presumptions of what a non-FTA counterfactual would
be like-thus leaving any conclusions only as strong as the underlying
assumptions. 226 Therefore, as one might expect, the literature
continues to remain inconclusive.

227

parties is not primarily diverted from more efficient external producers."); see also
BHAGWATI, supra note 217, at 17 (citing the work of Jacob Viner and noting that Viner
directed attention to how FTAs could re-route trade).
222. See World Trade Org. Secretariat, World Trade Report 2011 The WTO and
preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence 105 (2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/anrep-e/world-trade-reportl

1-_e.pdf

[https://perma.cc/34XU-URNJ] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
223. See id.
224. Id:
225. Id. (citing Caroline L. Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, Regional Trade
Agreements, 2 ANN. REV. OF EcON. 139 (2010)). A second version of this paper exists as
Caroline L. Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, Regional Trade Agreements, (World Bank Policy
2010),
No.
5314,
Paper
Working
Research,
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/367221468337914543/pdf/WPS5314.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74WA-PM48] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
226. See Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, Regional trade agreements:
Blessing or Burden?, Vox EUR. UNION (June 2, 2010), https://voxeu.org/article/regional-

trade-agreements-blessing-or-burden [https://perma.cc/G6CV-ARBP] (archived Aug. 18,
2020) ("Unfortunately, estimating trade creation and trade diversion is no easy task - it
requires knowledge of the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to trade if there
were no trade agreement. As this is unknown, assumptions must be made.").
227. For an example of a study confirming trade creation rather than trade
diversion, see Mamit Deme & Estrella R. Ndrianasy, Trade-Creation and tradediversifications effects of regional trade arrangements:low-income countries, 49 APPLIED

EcON. 2188, 2188 (2017) (concluding that "Accounting for heterogeneity in third
countries reveals that an RTA among low-income countries has a particularly robust
trade-creation effect."). However, there are findings which suggest conclusions to the
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In summary, FTAs are an exception to the foundational principle
of MFN and nondiscrimination among WTO members. FTAs have
proliferated greatly in the last twenty-five years, yet it is still unclear
whether they increase net economic welfare for the world trading

system as a whole.
How does the Poison Pill relate to the debate about trade
diversion? The Poison Pill is an overt attempt to deter trade with China
through the threat of expulsion from the USMCA. If China is the most

efficient producer of goods (e.g., manufactured goods such as
electronics) 228 that Canadians desire, then it may well make sense for
Canada to enter into an FTA with China. Conversely, to the extent that
Canada is the most efficient producer of goods (e.g., natural
resources) 229 that China desires, it also makes sense for China to enter

into an FTA with Canada. China is already Canada's second largest
country trading partner and Canada has long had a potential CanadaChina FTA in mind, both of which suggest that an FTA may well be
efficient for both countries.

If that is case, then the Poison Pill would be a provision that
amplifies the concern that FTAs can be trade diverting. FTAs already
allow WTO members to discriminate against other WTO members by
excluding them from the preferential treatment afforded to FTA

parties. Now the Poison Pill exacerbates that tension by further
discriminating against select, targeted WTO members (any nation
deemed to be a non-market economy). If FTAs "entrench the very
discrimination that the WTO rules seek to eliminate" 23 0 then the
Poison Pill is a weaponized version of this entrenchment-one that
specifically targets its discrimination and intensifies trade-diversion
concerns.

contrary, for example, see Shujiro Urata & Misa Okabe, Trade Creationand Diversion
Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: A Product-level Analysis, 37 WORLD ECON. 267,
287 (2014) ("RTAs among developing countries give rise to trade diversion for many more
products compared with the RTAs among developed countries."). See also Zakaria
Sorgho, RTAs'Proliferationand Trade-diversionEffects: Evidence of the 'SpaghettiBowl'
Phenomenon, 39 (2) WORLD EcON. 285, 297 (2015).

228.

See,

e.g.,

Pascal

Tremblay,

Trade

and Investment: Canada-China,
SERV.
2
(2014).
https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/TradeAndInves
tment/PDF/2014/2014-54-e.pdf [https://perma.c/TNX3-DT3J] (archived Aug. 18, 2020)
("Canada's highest-valued imports from China in 2013 were laptop computers, cellular
telephones, and telephonic switching apparatus and modems, which together accounted
for 15.7% of the value of Canada's imports from the country.").
229. See id. ("Canada's highest valued exports to China in 2013 were canola seeds,
iron ore and concentrates, and wood pulp, which together accounted for 24.7% of the
value of Canada's exports to the country.").
230. Andrew D. Mitchell & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, Legal requirements for PTAs
under the WTO, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COMMENTARY AND
ANALYSIS 81, 81 (Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2nd ed. 2015).
PARLIAMENTARY

INFO.

&

RES.
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B. Coercion in FTAs: National Security and Abuse of "Voluntarism"
Below, this Part analyzes how the United States unjustly invoked
national security exceptions under GATT to obtain leverage during

USMCA negotiations. This Article suggests that such coercive tactics
violate the WTO Agreement by later focusing on the WTO's prohibition
of "voluntary restraint agreements."

1. Coercive Use of National Security Grounds in USMCA Negotiations
The recent use of national security grounds as a trade-negotiating
tool against weaker nations is a reason for concern about the future of
international trade. On March 8, 2018, the United States announced

232
23
The Trump
that it was imposing tariffs on aluminum 1 and steel.
Administration announced that this was justified on national security
grounds. 233 GATT Article XXI allows WTO members to take whatever
actions necessary to protect their security interests, even if those

234
However, the
actions would have otherwise breached GATT.
legitimacy of the Unites States' invocation of national security grounds

was highly questionable.
The purported rationale for invoking steel and aluminum tariffs

would be that these materials are essential for military defense and
the United States cannot be dependent on foreign suppliers for these
materials. Although U.S. Defense Secretary, James Mattis, supported
the Trump Administration's tariffs, he expressed concern about the

2 35
Furthermore he had
effect these tariffs would have on US allies.
acknowledged in an internal memo that even 3 percent of the total steel
and aluminum produced domestically in the United States would be
236
Such an excess
enough to satisfy the needs of the US military.

"

231. See generally Proclamation 9758, 83 Fed. Reg. 25849 (May 31, 2018).
232. See generally Proclamation 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018).
233. See id. ¶ 2; see also Proclamation 9758 1 2.
234. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XXI: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed...(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ....
235. See David Lawder & David Chance, U.S. defense department says prefers
(Feb.
22,
2018),
aluminum
tariffs,
REUTERS
targeted
steel,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-steel/u-s-defense-department-says[https://perma.cc/2KK2prefers-targeted-steel-aluminum-tariffs-idUSKCN1G706A
XG6W] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said he was
concerned about the potential impact of the proposed measures on U.S. allies, adding
that was the reason he preferred targeted tariffs.").
236. See Adam Behsudi, Memo shows Mattis backed Commerce findings on steel,
aluminum, POLITICO (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morningtrade/2018/02/23/memo-shows-mattis-backed-commerce-findings-on-steel-aluminum-

113498 [https://perma.cc/4SNH-Y5UN] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("However, because
U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum represent only about 3 percent of
U.S. production, DoD does not believe the import threat is so grave that it will not be
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capacity likely made it clear to US trading partners that the United
States' invocation of national security grounds was merely an excuse
to impose what would otherwise be prohibited tariffs under GATT.
Even Jennifer Hillman, former general counsel to the United States
Trade Representative, referred to the US tariffs as "reckless"23 7 and
stated that the Trump Administration was "making overly broad
interpretations of national security" 238 and that these "actions
undermine international law and threaten the rules-based global
trading system." 2 39

These tariffs were negotiating leverage for the United States as it
negotiated the USMCA with Canada during this time period. 240
However, the United States continued to impose these tariffs even
after it had signed the USMCA with Canada and Mexico. It was only

about year later that the United States agreed to remove the tariffs in
exchange for Canada and Mexico removing their respective retaliatory
tariffs against the United States.2 4 ' The tariffs were viewed as being

an obstacle to the ratification of the USMCA 24 2 and their removal was
required if the United States wanted to see Canada and Mexico ratify
the USMCA. 243
If national security, rather than trade, was truly the motivation
behind the US imposition of tariffs, then it is remarkable that the
United States would remove those tariffs in order to facilitate a trade
deal. Did the United States really exchange its national security for a
trade deal with Canada and Mexico? More likely, as the critics of the
tariffs have surmised-there never really was a national security issue

able to acquire the steel and aluminum it needs for national defense requirements,

Mattis said.").
237. Jennifer Hillman, Trump Tariffs Threaten National Security, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/trump-national-securitytariffs.html [https://perma.cc/KJ7A-E7QL] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Krawchenko, supra note 85.
241. See Joint Statement by Canadaand the United States on Section 232 Duties
on
Steel
and
Aluminum,
GLOB.
AFF.
CAN.
(May
17,
2019),
https://www.canada.calen/global-affairs/news/2019/05/joint-statement-by-the-unitedstates-and-canada-on-section-232-duties-on-steel-and-aluminum.html
[https://perma.cc/XP5C-74DB] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
242. See Jenny Leonard, Joe Deaux & Josh Wingrove, Trump removes Steel,
Aluminum Tariffs on Canada and Mexico, BLoOMBERG (May 17, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/u-s-poised-to-remove-steelaluminum-tariffs-on-canada-mexico [https://perma.cc/43JV-TP95] (archived Aug. 18,
2020).
243. See Mike Blanchfield & James McCarten, U.S. agrees to lift steel and
aluminum tariffs from
Canada, Mexico,
FIN. POST (May
17, 2019),
https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/update- 1-u-s-nears-removal-of-tariffson-canada-mexico-metals-media [https://perma.cc/5VMU-MGEY] (archived Aug. 18,
2020).
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24 4
In an opinion for the
to begin with. It was just a bargaining tool.

New York Times (entitled "America the Cowardly Bully"), Professor
Paul Krugman (winner of a Nobel Prize in economics for his work on
international trade) provided his frank assessment of the situation:
On US unreliability, consider the way the current administration has treated
Canada, probably the friendliest neighbor and firmest ally any nation has ever
had. Despite generations of good relations and a free-trade agreement, Trump
imposed large tariffs on Canadian aluminum and steel, invoking national
security as a justification. This was obviously specious-in fact, Trump himself
basically conceded this point, justifying the tariffs instead as retaliation for
Canadian dairy policy (which was also specious). The lesson for the world is that
America can't be trusted. Why bother making deals with a country that's willing
to slap sanctions on the best of allies, and clearly lie about the reasons, whenever
245
it feels like it?

2. Poison Pill as Newly Incarnated Type of "Voluntary Restraint"
Agreement
Are countries permitted to use the threat of trade sanctions to
coerce other countries to "voluntarily" restrain themselves from selling
goods? This very question was explored in the mid-to-late 1980s by the
246
A voluntary
WTO in its consideration of voluntary export restraints.
agrees to
voluntarily
that
country
a
to
refers
export restraint (VER)
limit its exports of a certain product to another country.2 4 7 Technically,
one might argue that this does not violate GATT because it is not a
248
The question of
quota being imposed by the importing country.

VERs (also referred to as "grey area" measures) was considered in 1988

249
The issue
by a GATT Panel in the case of Japan-Semiconductors.
its
through
XI:1
Article
GATT
violated
had
Japan
was whether
250
part
was
VER
This
semiconductors.
its
own
voluntary restriction of

of an agreement between the United States and Japan that was

244. See Hillman, supra note 237 ("At the same time, Congress must ensure that
genuine concerns are not traded away for limited economic gains. Cavalier use of rarely
invoked laws will only undermine their purpose and put the trading system at risk.").
245. Paul Krugman, America the Cowardly Bully, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/opinion/trump-trade-war.html

[https://perma.cc/9WLY-A6KG] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
246. See Panel Report, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶¶ 1-8, WTO Doc.
L/6309 - 35S/116 (adopted May 4, 1988) [hereinafter Japan-Semiconductors].
247. See Daniel C. K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade
Organization,37 B.U. INT'L. L. J. 1, 26-27 (2019).
248. See id. ("The reasoning was that if the exporting country voluntarily agreed
to lmit the volume of its exports, then a quota was not involved .... ").
249. See Japan-Semiconductors,supra note 246, ¶T 1-8.
250. See Geraldo Vidigal, The Return of Voluntary Export Restraints? How WTO
Law Regulates (And Doesn't Regulate) Bilateral Trade-Restrictive Agreements, 53 J.
WORLD TRADE 187, 197 (2019).
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entered into on September 2, 1988.251 In its decision, the GATT Panel
considered GATT Article XI:1 carefully. Article XI:1 states that
members shall not impose prohibitions or restrictions on the import or
export of products destined to other members (other than duties, taxes
or other charges). 252 The Panel stated that a violation of Article XI:1
could be found if it could be shown that (1) nonmandatory measures
(i.e., restraint of exports) were supported by "sufficient incentives or
disincentives" 25 3 and (2) the trade restrictive measures were
"essentially dependent on Government action or intervention. 25 4

Ultimately, the Panel concluded that both criteria were met and that
the voluntary restraints violated Article XI: 1.255

A significant aspect of the Japan-Semiconductors case is that the
Panel was willing to look beyond legal formality to the actual substance
of the relationship between the Japanese Government and exporters,

even in the absence of formal binding legal provisions. 256 After

considering the de facto existence of incentives and disincentives and
how the Japanese Government interacted with exporters, 25 7 the Panel
held that the Japanese government had created an administrative
structure designed to "exert maximum possible pressure on the private
sector"258 in enforcing the export restraints and thus violated Article

XI:1.259
Another interesting facet of this case is that the complainant was
the European Economic Community (i.e., a party who was not privy to

the arrangement between the United States and Japan), 26 0 which
serves as a reminder that GATT is multilateral agreement-

251. See Japan-Semiconductors,supra note 246, ¶ 12.
252. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XI:1 (titled "General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions").
253. Japan- Semiconductors, supranote 246, 1 109.
254. Id.
255. See id. ¶ 130 ("The Japanese measures relating to exports of semi-conductors
to third country markets had been found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1. They were
therefore, according to GATT practice, presumed to have nullified or impaired the
benefits accruing to the EEC under the General Agreement (BISD 26S/216).").
256. See id. ¶ 111 (noting that "the Japanese Government's measures did not need
to be legally binding to take effect, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that there
were sufficient incentives or disincentives for Japanese producers and exporters to
conform.").

257. See id. 11 112-14 (discussing the Panel analysis of the Japanese
government's system of administrative guidance, information that Japanese producers
had to submit and the use of supply and demand forecasts).
258. Id. ¶ 117.
259. See id. ("The Panel concluded that the complex of measures constituted a
coherent system restricting the sale for export of monitored semi-conductors at prices
below company-specific costs to markets other that [sic] the United States, inconsistent
with Article XI.1.").
260. See id. ¶ 1; see also William J. Long, The U.S. - Japan SemiconductorDispute:
Implicationsfor U.S. Trade Policy, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 35 (1988) (commenting
that "[t]he EC was the uninvited guest to the dispute. It viewed the agreement as a
threat to its trading interests." (footnote omitted)).
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agreements between two members can affect other members' rights
under GATT. 261 In this case, the US-Japan agreed-upon voluntary
restraint would affect the economic interests of the EC regarding
semiconductors. 262 Therefore, the decision is important because it

affirms that affected GATT members, who are not party to a bilateral
agreement between other members, may nevertheless challenge
263
Additionally, there were
voluntary restraints under Article XI:2.
other submissions by other countries (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Brazil) all of whom complained about the negative

effects of Japan's VER. 264
Moving past the Japan-Semiconductors case, as of 1994, the WTO
Agreement now directly addresses VERs via the WTO's Agreement on
26 5
The Safeguard Agreement
Safeguards (Safeguard Agreement).
permits members to take temporary actions to protect their domestic
industries from actual or threatened serious injury by a surge of

imports.26 6 More importantly, Article 11 of the Safeguard Agreement
casts a wide net against VERs and prohibits "voluntary export

restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar
267
and states that it is
measures on the export or the import side"
2 68
intended to apply against the actions of one or more members.
Encompassing the ruling in the Japan-Semiconductors case, Article 11

looks past formal legal agreements and states that it applies to "actions
under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by
2 69
In his discussion about the background to
two or more Members."
the prohibition of VERs, Chow observes: "Of course, the WTO and other
nations immediately recognized that VERs entered into under the

261. See Vidigal, supra note 250, at 197.
262. See Amelia Porges, Japan-Tradein Semi-Conductors No. L/6309, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 388, 390 ("Dependent on semiconductor imports for its electronics industry, the
EC objected to the increase in prices; it also alleged that U.S. firms would receive
privileged access to the Japanese market.").
263. See Vidigal, supra note 250, at 197 (observing that "[t]he Panel's finding
confirms that GATT Article XI:1 prohibits grey area measures that negatively affect
third parties, but does not touch upon the question whether the US-Japan arrangement
itself (which was notified to the GATT Contracting Parties) was compatible with the
GATT." (footnote omitted)).
264. See Japan-Semiconductors,supra note 246, T¶ 83-95.
265. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154
[https://perma.cc/35K4https://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/25-safege.htm
LH2U] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Safeguard Agreement].
266. See generally Agreement on Safeguards, WORLD TRADE ORG., (last visited
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/safege/safeint.htm
2020)
8,
Mar.
[https://perma.cc/43DJ-PSS2] [archived Aug. 18, 2020] (generally discussing the nature
of the Safeguard Agreement).
267. Safeguard Agreement, supra note 265, art. 11, ¶ 1(b) (emphasis added).
268. See id.
269. Id.
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threat of trade sanctions by the United States were not in fact
'voluntary' but the result of intimidation." 270
Yet the explicit prohibition against VERs has not deterred the
United States from using economic pressure to extract VERs from
other countries. After the United States imposed its steel and
aluminum tariffs in 2018 (under the questionable grounds of national
security), 271 it lifted steel tariffs imposed against Argentina, Brazil,

and South Korea after each country agreed to a VER. 2 72 With respect
to South Korea, the US President's executive proclamation is even bold
enough to refer to the measures as including a "quota."2 73 The dubious

invocation of national security followed by the acceptance of voluntary
quotas by all these countries contradicts not only GATT Article XI:1

but also the Safeguards Agreement which addresses this exact
circumstance.
Yong-Shik Lee specifically examined the VERs of Argentina,
Brazil, and South Korea and concluded that they were "inconsistent"2 74
with the Safeguards Agreement and WTO principles. Lee also noted

that these VERs represent a "danger to the trading system" worthy of
the concern of the WTO Council. 275 Daniel Chow's observations are
even more direct-he states that the South Korean VER is a
"contravention"276 of the Safeguards Agreement and that:
[The] United States intimidated South Korea into accepting a quota in violation
of GATT Article XI. As for U.S. claims that its threats of sanctions are merely a
negotiation tactic and are not coercive, the EU summed up the view of many
countries when it stated there is no negotiation when "it is with a gun to our
2 77
head."

The prohibition of VERs and the recent plight of Argentina,

Brazil, and South Korea demonstrates that restrictions on so-called
"voluntary

agreements"

are

not

a

novelty-particularly

under

270. Chow, supranote 247, at 27.
271. See Rachel Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again, 113
AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 61, 64 (2019) [hereinafter Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement]
(referring to the US tariffs on aluminum and steel imports and remarking "The
American claims of national security justifications for these goods strain credulity .... ").
272. See generally Proclamation 9740, 83 Fed. Reg. 20683 (Apr. 30, 2018).
273. Id. ¶ 4 (President Trump refers to the measures agreed upon by the US and
South Korea as "...including a quota that restricts the quantity of steel articles imported
into the United States from South Korea.").
274. Yong-Shik Lee, The Steel and Aluminum Quota Agreements: A Question of
Compatibility with WTO Disciplines and Their Impact on the World Trading System, 53
J. WORLD TRADE 811, 831 (2019).
275. Id. at 832.
276. Chow, supra note 247, at 28.
277. Id. at 28-29 (quoting Richard Lough & Philip Blenkinsop, EU Complains of
"Gun
to
Our
Head"
Over
Tariffs,
REUTERS
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eureax/eu-complains-of-trumps-gun-to-

our-head-over-tariffs-idUSKBN 1 GZ1 4K [https://perma.cc/H H6Y-TK4B] (archived
Aug. 18, 2020)).
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circumstances of unequal bargaining power. The Poison Pill is similar
to VERs in three important ways. First, both provisions limit trade-

VERs are quotas on the export of goods while the Poison Pill restricts
USMCA parties' choice of FTA partners. Second, both provisions are
also allegedly voluntary agreements but, in both cases, they were
actually agreed to under coercive circumstances. Third, both VERs and
Poison Pills violate specific WTO principles. VERs violate GATT
provisions on quotas and, more particularly, the Safeguard
Agreements prohibition on VERs. As was argued in Part III, the Poison
Pill contradicts GATT Article XXIV on FTAs by imposing unnecessary

trade-restrictive measures that ironically derive a great deal of force
from MFN obligations. Despite the WTO prohibition against VERs, the
United States persisted in extracting VERs from Argentina, Brazil,

and South Korea. Such actions suggest that the United States could
persist in its use of the Poison Pill 278 even if the WTO rules that the
Poison Pill contradicts the WTO Agreement.
C. Implications and Strategies for Middle Powers and Developing

Nations
Although the Poison Pill violates the WTO Agreement, there are
several practical obstacles towards an enforceable ruling against the
inclusion of the Poison Pill in an FTA. In 1996, the WTO established
the Committee on RTAs (CRTA) to oversee FTAs. 279 However, its role
has been mainly to guide the system of notification (i.e., members must
notify the WTO when an FTA is formed) and transparency established

through

a

2006

General

Council

Decision. 280 Although

it is

praiseworthy that the CRTA provides a forum for discussions on the
impact of FTAs, there has never been a CRTA decision invalidating an
28 1
FTA for noncompliance with GATT Article XXIV.
Theoretically, any WTO member could bring a complaint about

the Poison Pill. The argument would be the USMCA violates GATT

Article XXIV because the Poison Pill raises a trade barrier against
other WTO members. The most likely complainant would be China.
However, any WTO member affected by the preferential treatment

278. Cf. Lee, supra note 274, at 831. In the parallel universe of VERs, Lee worries
that "more of the steel exporting countries might join the quota agreements with the
United States." Id.
279. See Regional trade agreements and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/region_e/scope_rtae.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2020) [https://perma.cc/E73C-QPXL] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (discussing the
establishment of the CRTA).
280.

See The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG.,

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/regione/regcome.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/X4BY-79S6] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (describing the responsibilities of
the CRTA).
281. See Mitchell & Lockhart, supra note 230, at 112.
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afforded by the USMCA signatories to each other would have an
incentive to complain. 28 2 Any WTO member who trades with a USMCA

country may complain that the preferential tariffs offered to USMCA
members should be offered to all members on an MFN basis.
The most drastic ruling possible would be that the USMCA is void
due to the Poison Pill negating its status as a valid FTA under WTO
rules-in which case the signatories have to stop providing preferential
treatment to each other or provide the same treatment to all other
WTO members pursuant to MFN obligations. Alternatively, the WTO
could rule that only the Poison Pill is void. This would mean that the

United States could only invoke the withdrawal clause (if Canada
entered into an FTA with China to the displeasure of the United
States). The United States would have to renegotiate a bilateral FTA
with Mexico while Canada would be in a bilateral FTA with Mexicothus shifting the status-quo preservation away from the United States
and to Canada (as well as Mexico). Finally, the WTO panel could rule

that the Poison Pill does not offend any principle of the WTO
Agreement. While closing its eyes to this matter might be the easiest
route, for the reasons this Article presents, such a ruling would further

erode the legitimacy of the WTO.
However, these theoretical possibilities may be moot within the
context of the current US-China trade war and the recent actions of

the United States. First, the United States has blocked all
appointments to the WTO Appellate Body. 2 83 As of December 2019 the
appointments of two of the last three WTO Appellate judges expired. 284
A minimum of three judges is required to adjudicate a dispute. 2 85 Even
if a complaint is brought, there are no judges to hear the dispute. 286
Second, the questionable invocation of the GATT national security

exception, the coercive imposition of VERs, as well as the non-WTOsanctioned imposition of tariffs against China suggest that the United

282. For example, both the cases of Turkey-Textiles, supra note 138, at ¶ 1, and
Japan-Semiconductors,supra note 246, at ¶ 1, involved a third party challenging an
arrangement between other countries.

283. See Andrea Shalal, United States accuses WTO's Appellate Body of overreach
in dispute handling, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tradewto-usa/united-states-accuses-wtos-appellate-body-of-overreach-in-dispute-handlingidUSKBN2052TR [https://perma.cc/2A5K-LEUH] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (noting that
the US veto "essentially shut down the Appellate Body in December").
284. Members urge continued engagement on resolving Appellate Body issues,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl9 e/dsb_18dec19_e.htm
("On 10 December the Appellate Body was reduced to one member after the second terms
for two of the remaining three members expired. Normally composed of seven members,

the Appellate Body no longer has the minimum three members needed to hear new
appeals.").
285. See Rachel Brewster, Analyzing the Trump Administration's International
Trade Strategy, 42 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1419, 1425 (2019).
286. See Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement, supranote 271, at 64.
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287
States would not comply with a WTO ruling against the Poison Pill.
In short, why even bother complaining at the WTO if the United States
seems so intent on dismantling or ignoring the WTO?
This Article does not address the complex normative question of
whether a nation ought to pursue a deeper economic relationship with
China (or any other country). After careful analysis, some nations may
find it in their interest to pursue it while others may choose to refrain.
However, if a nation does decide to exercise its sovereign decision to
engage economically with China (or any other country that the United
States might unilaterally deem as a non-market country), this Article
outlines how that nation might minimize the impact of a Poison Pill

provision imposed by the United States. Although the discussion below
relates to Canada and China, it can be applied to any nation that
wishes to mitigate against the imposition of a Poison Pill type of
provision.
1. Join or Create Overlapping Multilateral FTAs
As noted in Part II, the CPTPP mitigates the risk of expulsion for
Canada by preserving a free trade relationship with Mexico outside of

the USMCA. 288 Interestingly, the failed predecessor to the CPTPP was
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which included the United States.
Although the United States had signed the TPP, under the Trump
289
leaving
Administration the United States withdrew from the TPP,
the remaining countries to form the CPTPP. From an American

perspective, the TPP was supposed to be a method by which the United
States could address some of its China-related trade grievances by

290
while also neutralizing some of
increasing US influence in Asia
China's competitive advantages.291 Ironically, this abandoned project

was reincarnated as the CPTPP and, instead of containing China,
helps protect Canada against the consequences of ignoring the Poison

Pill-a US provision that was meant to contain China's FTA
aspirations. Further, now that the United States is not a member of

the CPTPP, it has been argued that the United States has granted

287. Daniel Chow states the US position directly: "In other words, if the United
States disagrees with a WTO decision, the United States is not obliged to follow it." See
Chow, supra note 247, at 9.
288. See discussion supra Part II.A.
289. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian Sheldon & William McGuire, How the United
States Withdrawalfrom the Trans-PacificPartnershipBenefits China, U. PA. J.L. & PUB.
AFF. 37, 37 (2018).
290. See Daniel C. K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific
Partnershipto Contain China in InternationalTrade, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 370, 377 (2016)
(stating that the TPP is directed at letting "China know in no uncertain terms that the
U.S., not China, intends to write the rules of international trade for Asia and the rest of
the world in the twenty-first century.").
291. Id. at 376 (arguing that the TPP's provisions on worker rights and
environmental standards will be disadvantageous to China).
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China a golden opportunity to take the lead in establishing the norm
for Asian trade rules. 29 2
Canada is fortunate to have the CPTPP as a partial insurance

policy against the Poison Pill. This serves as a lesson to other nations
contemplating future FTAs involving the United States. The threat of
expulsion from a US-led FTA is greatly diminished if a nation already
has overlapping agreements with all or most of the members of that
US-led FTA. Returning to the "private club" analogy raised in Part II:
expulsion from a US-led "private club" can be mitigated by membership
in other "clubs" that consist of substantially the same members of the
US-led "private club." 29 3
Since 2012, a group of Asia-Pacific nations has been attempting to
create a multilateral FTA-the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership ("RCEP"). 2 94 The RCEP, if successfully formed as
currently contemplated, would encompass almost one-third of the
world population, spanning fifteen countries including China. 29 5 The
other countries under RCEP include Australia, Japan, New Zealand,

and South Korea, as well as all of the countries comprising the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN")-Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 296
Originally India was intended to be part of the RCEP and had
participated in negotiations. 2 97 However, India withdrew from the
RCEP negotiations in November 2019 citing concerns about safeguard
provisions 298 and other issues such as trade deficits and the handling

of private data. 2 99 Despite this setback, the fifteen nations at the
negotiating table aspire to formally enter into the RCEP in 2020.300
The nations who are both members of CPTPP and contemplated to be
members of RCEP are: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Brunei,

292. See Chow, Sheldon & McGuire, supra note 289, at 37.
293. See supra Part II.
294. See Chow, Sheldon & McGuire, supra note 289, at 75.
295. Xianbai Ji, RCEP's Economic Impact in Asia, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://thediplomat.com/2019/1 1/rceps-economic-impact-in-asia/
[https://perma.cc/HGG8-E4EL (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Mie Oba, The Implications of India's RCEP Withdrawal, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 14,
2019),
https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-implications-of-indias-rcep-withdrawal/
[https://perma.cc/U2QD-RA3N] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
299. See William Alan Reinsch, Jack Caporal & Lydia Murray, At Last, an RCEP
Deal,
CTR.
FOR
STRATEGIC
&
INT'L
STUD.
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-rcep-deal
[https://perma.cc/LBP7-Y2UK] (archived
Aug. 18, 2020).
300. Id.
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/

301
Through their dual CPTPP
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

RCEP membership, these nations would enjoy access to both Asian
markets (including China) and parts of North and South America

(Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Chile).
The disadvantage of numerous

overlapping

FTAs

is the

complexity of complying with the differing trade rules operating under

each FTA-a phenomenon famously referred to by economist Jagdish
Bhagwati as the "spaghetti bowl effect." 302 In order to determine what
tariff (if any) to impose on a good, one must first determine where the
good originated from. 303 This determination is done according to the
3 04
However, Bhagwati states
"rules of origin" associated with an FTA.

these differing rules force producers to undergo a complex analysis
"with a view to minimizing the cost of manufacture plus transportation
30 5
and results
and the differential tariffs and charges levied by origin"

in trade inefficiencies. 306 According to a recent review of empirical
studies by Zakaria Sorgho, the existence of overlapping FTAs
(including differing rules) may result in the inefficient diversion of

trade. 307 A nation could address this problem by joining larger,
multilateral FTAs,30 8 which would effectively consolidate the problem
309
-

of having many bilateral FTAs into a more manageable agreement
assuming that the multilateral rules prevail over any existing bilateral

rules. 310 Sorgho contends both the TPP and RCEP are good examples
311
of this type of solution to the "spaghetti bowl effect."
Although Canada is not currently contemplated to be a member of
the RCEP, it is worth noting that some countries (Australia, New
Zealand, Japan Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam) will have

overlapping membership in both CPTPP and RCEP, if the RCEP comes
to fruition.31 2 The downside for nations that are members of both

301. Yen Nee Lee, The world's largest trade deal could be signed in 2020- and the
US isn't in it, CNBC (Nov.11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/12/what-is-rcep-asia[https://perma.cc/9FKP-YG4J]
pacific-trade-deal-slated-to-be-worlds-largest-fta.html
(archived Aug. 18, 2020).
302. BHAGWATI, supra note 217, at 61.
303. Id. (".. . with PTAs, tariffs on specific commodities must depend on where a
product is supposed to originate (requiring inherently arbitrary 'rules of origin').").
304. Id.
305. Id. at 69. ("The complexity that the spaghetti bowls create for international
trade causes distortion in trade and investment.").
306. Id.
307. Zakaria Sorgho, The Spread of InternationalTrade Agreements - A Dynamics
Toward the 'Spaghetti Bowl' Phenomenon?, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS, 41, 49 (Robert E. Looney ed., 2019).
308. Id. (suggesting that a nation can "minimize trade diversion by signing a new
trade deal with a large bloc of partner countries ... ").
309. Alternatively, Sorgho suggests "negotiating several bilateral agreements
simultaneously." See id.
310. Id. at 50-51.
311. Id. at 51.
312. See Lee, supra note 301.
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CPTPP and RCEP (if successfully created) is that they are still
overlapping and possibly trade diverting to some extent. This would

have to be balanced against the benefits of membership-access to
more markets on an FTA basis. For any nation subject to a Poison Pill
type provision with the United States, the added benefit is that
overlapping FTAs may provide that nation a protective safety network
of FTAs to minimize the consequences of expulsion (pursuant to a

trade-restrictive clause like the Poison Pill). On the other hand, even
strong nations like the United Kingdom may find themselves
vulnerable to US requests for a Poison Pill if they have diminished
multilateral support. Now that the United Kingdom has exited the EU,
it seeks to have a trade agreement with the United States. 313 Yet, it

has been reported that the United States is actively seeking to have a
Poison Pill inserted in the proposed agreement. 314 If the United
Kingdom were negotiating this agreement while still enjoying the
benefits of EU membership, it likely would be in a much better position
to resist US demands for a Poison Pill.
2. Develop Relationships Outside of an FTA: BRI and Alternate WTO
Dispute Resolution
The Poison Pill is intended to deter Canada from entering into an

FTA with China. Yet from Canada's perspective, an FTA is not an end
in and of itself. If Canada exercised its sovereign decision to pursue an

FTA with China-at least one of the goals would be potentially greater
prosperity for Canadians through increased economic interaction with
China. An FTA is not the only way to achieve that goal. Canadian
participation in the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be
an alternate means to shared economic prosperity with China while
also allowing Canada to engage with other countries who also

participate in BRI. In 2013, the BRI was proposed by Chinese
President Xi Jinping as a means of creating an intercontinental trade
route on a grand scale (composed of both a land and maritime route). 315

The word "belt" in the BRI is a reference to the Silk Road trade route
that spanned Europe and Asia over 2000 years ago. 316

313.
-

It is an

See Patrick Wintour, US Message to Britain in Bilateral Trade Talks: It's Us
or
China,
GUARDIAN
(May
12,
2020),

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/may/12/us-message-to-britain-in-bilateral-

trade-talks-its-us-or-china [https://perma.cc/BS4B-KBKS] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
314. Id.
315. See Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative,
The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects, BELT & ROAD

PORTAL
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.htm
[https://perma.cc/EXC4-XVW5] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
316. Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, STATE COUNCIL CHINA (Mar. 30,
2015),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.h
tm [https://perma.cc/4MME-QFLC] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
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ambitious project which according to the World Bank would link 71

economies
foreign

317

and in "2017 these economies received 35% of global

direct

investments

and

accounted

for

40%

of

global

merchandise exports." 318
A study by the World Bank Group estimates that BRI could "lift

7.6 million people from extreme poverty (those earning less than
$1.90/day) and 32 million people from moderate poverty (those earning

less than $3.20/day." 319 It is also predicted that nations along BRI

320
routes will benefit from a 2.8-9.7 percent increase in trade. Yet, such
impressive growth is accompanied by risks-identified by the World
Bank
as
including
debt
sustainability,
governance
risks,
environmental risks, and social risks. 32 1 From a legal perspective,

scholars have identified other challenges such as the need to have
322
and
enforceable remedies for breach of obligations related to BRI
establishing

a

reliable

system

of

arbitration for

BRI-related

disputes. 323
Accordingly, the extent (if any) to which Canada should
participate in the BRI requires the Canadian government's assessment
of the potential benefits and risks to Canada. It also requires
evaluation of whether Canadian participation in specific BRI projects
is

consistent

with

Canadian

values

regarding

workers,

the

environment, and other socially relevant issues. These evaluations
may be complex and must be disentangled from narratives which may

not be a complete account of the issue. One example of such an issue is
the "debt-trap diplomacy" theory, which argues that China uses
predatory lending practices against nations (particularly nations
contemplated within BRI) in order to trap them into a situation where
they must cede to the wishes of China in exchange for debt relief or

forgiveness.

324

(Mar. 29,
BANK
WORLD
Initiative,
and Road
317. Belt
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-roadinitiative#02 [https://perma.cc/9QUJ-TY8Q] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
318. Id.

2018),

319. WORLD BANK GRP., BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
OF TRANSPORT CORRIDORS xiii (2019), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-

integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transportcorridors [https://perma.cc/2DD5-NX3L] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See Guiguo Wang, Legal Challenges to the Belt and Road Initiative, 4 J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 309 (2017). Wang states: ".. . a sound enforcement mechanism is crucial to
the success of the BR." Id. at 328.
323. See Patrick M. Norton, China's Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for
Arbitration in Asia, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 72, 72 (2018).
324. See Deborah Brautigam, A Critical Look at Chinese 'Debt-Trap Diplomacy:
The Rise of a Meme, 5 AREA DEv. POL. 1, 2 (2020) (referring to the term as "the claim
that China deliberately seeks to entrap countries in a web of debt to secure some kind of
strategic advantage or asset of some kind.").

20201

THE 'POISONPILL 'IN THE USMCA

1319

The debt-trap diplomacy theory has been fueled by accusations
from high-level US officials. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been
quoted as condemning BRI as "bribe-fuelled debt-trap diplomacy" 325 by
the Chinese government and Vice President Pence has expressed the

same sentiment. 326 One news story that has fueled the debt-trap
diplomacy theory has been the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka.
According to the New York Times, Sri Lanka had to turn over or "cough

up"3 27 the port of Hambantota to China because it was so laden with
Chinese debt. 328 However, it is questionable whether this "oft-told
tale," 329 involving Sri Lanka leasing the port to China for 99 years, 33 0
is complete and accurate. According to Nilanthi Samaranayuke's
report for the United States Institute of Peace, "Sri Lanka's debt to
China is 5.5 percent of the country's total debt. In other words, 94.5 per
cent of Sri Lanka's debt is not to China. When narrowing the scope to
external debt listed ($32.565 billion), this proportion rises to 12
percent." 331 Two academics interviewed Sri Lankan officials and noted
that Sri Lanka did not default on any loan obligations, Sri Lanka
retains ownership of Hambantota Port, and the money from the

Hambantota port lease were primarily applied to Western loans (which
bore higher interest than Chinese loans). 332 In a recent article in the
Diplomat, an economist concluded: "Leasing out Hambantota port is
not evidence of the Chinese debt trap. Instead, it is more of a reflection

of the external sector crisis Sri Lanka is facing." 333

325. Ben Blanchard, China Says 'Fed Up' with Hearing U.S. Complaintson Belt
and Road, REUTERS (May 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroadusa/china-says-fed-up-with-hearing-u-s-complaints-on-belt-and-road-idUSKCN1SFUY
[https://perma.cc/DGJ9-MW34] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
326. War of Words Between Mike Pence, Xi Jinping at APEC Summit: Here's What
They Said, NAT'L POST (Nov. 19, 2018), https://nationalpost.com/news/world/war-ofwords-between-mike-pence-xi-jinping-derails-the-apec-summit-heres-what-was-said
[https://perma.cc/JEK5-ZQE2] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
327. Maria Abi-Habib, How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lankaport.html [https://perma.cc/PX85-W8BR] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
328. Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, The Truth About Sri Lanka's Hambantota
Port, Chinese 'Debt Traps' and Asset Seizures', SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 6,
2019), https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3008799/truth-about-srilankas-hambantota-port-chinese-debt-traps
[https:/perma.cc/56VK-YFFT] (archived
Aug. 18, 2020).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Nilanthi Samaranayake, China's Engagement with Smaller South Asian
Countries,
U.S.
INST.
PEACE
SPECIAL
REPORT
NO.
446
4
(2019),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sr_446chinas_engagementwithsmallersouthasiancountries.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SJ4BU4B] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
332. See Sautman & Hairong, supra note 328.
333. Umesh Moramudali, The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities,
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 1, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-
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While the BRI involves risks that include debt sustainability, the
debt-trap diplomacy accusation is not supported by several recent
studies. A report published by the Australia-based Lowy Institute in

October 2019 stated that: "The evidence to date suggests that China
has not been engaged in deliberate debt-trap diplomacy in the Pacific"
3 34
and there
but also acknowledged that it is a "nuanced picture"
335
remains a risk of debt sustainability regarding Chinese loans.

Regarding the African continent, a 2018 study from the China Africa
research initiative (based out of the John Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies) found that "Chinese loans are not currently a
336
Under these
major contributor to debt distress in Africa."
circumstances, it would be better to engage in more empirical, detailed

studies to rationally gauge what risks Chinese loans present and what
can be done to address those risks. A recent study conducted through
337
found that eight
the US-based Center for Global Development
countries (out of sixty-eight countries studied) are at risk of BRI338
The study also found that China has provided
related debt distress.
339
debt relief to other nations including write-offs and restructuring.

The main criticism is that these debt-relief measures have been ad hoc,
though the study acknowledges that China has been "moving to greater
policy coherence and discipline when it comes to avoiding
unsustainable debt." 340 The study concludes that: "It is unlikely that
BRI will be plagued with widescale debt sustainability problems. But
it is also unlikely that the initiative will avoid any instances of debt
34 1
The study recommends
problems among its participating countries."

myths-and-realities/ [https://perma.cc/VY36-AD45] (archived Aug. 18, 2020); see also
Dushni Weerakoon, Sri Lanka's debt problem isn't made in China, EAST ASIA F. (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/02/28/sri-lankas-debt-problem-isnt-made-inchina/ [https://perma.cc/54CL-8AZW] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
334. Roland Rajah, Alexandre Dayant & Jonathan Pryke, Ocean of Debt? Belt and
Road and Debt Diplomacy in the Pacific, LOWY INST. (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debtdiplomacy-pacific [https://perma.cc/4HUQ-6XJG] (archived Sept. 19, 2020).
335. See id.
336. Janet Eom, Deborah Brautigam & Lina Benabdallah, The Path Ahead: The
7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 1 CHINA AFRICA RES. INITIATIVE 1 (2018)
83
fc
https://static l.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5c4677548985
9a99131f/1548121941093/Briefing+Paper+1+-+August+2018+-+Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4H6-RFY2] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
337. See generally John Hurley, Scott Morris & Gailyn Portelance, Examining the
Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, 121 CTR.
GLOB.

DEV.POL'Y

PAPER

(March

2018),

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-roadinitiative-policy-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/92F9-9YU3] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
338. Id. at 1.
339. Id. at 20.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 21.
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that China multilateralize the BRI as a method of providing greater
coherence and alignment with its partners. 342

Therefore, Canada needs to evaluate the extent, if any, to which
it would participate in the BRI-balancing the benefits of participation
(which would include its ability to partially mitigate the Poison Pill's
influence) against matters such as debt sustainability for borrower
nations, the degree of influence or voice that Canada would have in
BRI ventures, geopolitical implications, and consistency with
Canadian values. In undertaking such an analysis, Canada should be
wary of US government and media narratives which may overestimate
the risks of BRI in comparison to expert findings. David Dollar of the
Washington-based Brookings Institute sums it well: "Dial down the
anti-China rhetoric; many of these projects will have net benefits, and
unremitting hostility to Chinese lending makes the United States seem
uninformed. 343 Expanding its opportunities in BRI allows Canada to
at least nominally circumvent the Poison Pill and pursue increased
trade with China outside of a formal FTA. China has indicated that
participation in the BRI is open to all nations, not simply those directly
on the BRI route-a sentiment recently reiterated by Lu Xu, (consul
general for China in Calgary, Canada) who noted the benefits to
Canada if it were to participate in the BRI. 3 44 In addition to allowing
Canada the opportunity to work alongside Chinese businesses, the BRI
is a pathway towards Canada working with other BRI nations on
critical infrastructure projects. 34 5 The BRI integrates African
nations 346 into its vision and harmonizes well with the strategy of
overlapping multilaterals by promoting Canada's engagement with
African countries.34 7 As the Business Council of Canada's report states:

342. Id.
343. David Dollar, Understanding China's Belt and Road InfrastructureProjects
in Africa, BROOKINGS INST., 8 (Sep. 29, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_bridollar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3S4QMGV] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
344. See Lu Xu, Opinion, What China's Belt and Road Initiative Could Mean to
Alberta,
CALGARY
HERALD
(May
25,
2019),
https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/opinion-what-chinas-belt-and-roadinitiative-means-to-alberta-oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/26MB-KRXG] (Archived Aug.
18, 2020); see also Eva Busza & Iris Jin, CanadaCannot Afford to Miss the Boat on the
Belt and Road, ASIA PAC. FOUND. CAN. (May 31, 2017), https://www.asiapacific.ca/opeds/canada-cannot-afford-miss-boat-belt-and-road
[https:/perma.cc/H3C5-L76B]
(archived Aug. 18, 2020) ("China has also made it clear that the Initiative creates no
boundaries, and that any country can join in its own way.").
345. Daniel Drache, A.T. Kingsmith & Duan Qi, Canada is Missing the Boat on
China's Belt
and Road Initiative, POL'Y OPTIONS
(Jan.
22,
2020),
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2020/canada-is-missing-the-boat-onchinas-belt-and-road-initiative/ [https://perma.ec/QL86-EKAA] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
346. See Dollar, supra note 343.
347. See Mike Blanchfield & Mia Rabson, Trudeau Urged to Scramble for African
Business
and
Trade
Opportunities,
NAT'L
POsT
(Feb.
11,
2020),
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"Meeting Canada's trade diversification target will simply not be
possible without an Africa strategy. The opportunity for Canada in
348
Africa is enormous."
To be clear, this Article does not seek to make any prescriptive
claims about whether Canada ought to participate in BRI. It submits
that an assessment of BRI should informed by expert findings and

empirical data. It also notes that the BRI can help Canada offset the
Poison Pill's effects by allowing Canada to engage with China outside
of an FTA and develop overlapping FTAs with African nations.

Whether the benefits of such an offset outweigh any disadvantages of
participation remains a complex normative question to be determined
by Canada.
A Canadian strategy of developing international relationships
may also include participating in innovative methods of addressing a

US erosion of WTO principles. In response to the US blocking appellate
judge appointments, the EU and Canada (in July 2019) agreed upon a
trade dispute resolution system among themselves that would be
binding. 349 On January 24, 2020, the EU announced that this alliance

had added fifteen more nations (including Australia, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, South Korea, Mexico, New
35 0
with a
Zealand, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, and Uruguay)
view to "preserving a functioning and two-step dispute-settlement

35
system at the WTO in disputes among them." 1 The statement issued
by the Ministers of all participating nations alludes to the WTO
appellate body crisis that was precipitated by the United States-

stating that the arrangement is a temporary measure until a "fully

https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/trudeau-urged-to-scramblefor-african-business-and-trade-opportunities [https://perma.cc/DEE8-DW36]
(archived Aug. 18, 2020) (reporting on chief business executives urging Canada to
promote business with African nations).
348. The Business Council of Canada, Why Africa? Building Canada's Economic
Ties to the World's Fastest-Growing Continent, BUS. COUNCIL (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://thebusinesscouncil.ca/publications/why-africa-building-canadas-economic-tiesto-the-worlds-fastest-growing-continent/ [https://perma.cc/9F35-5SML] (archived Aug.
18, 2020) (noting also that Canadian exports "to the region could reach USD 6.6 billion
in 2030, representing a growth potential of about USD 4.1 billion over the coming
decade.").

349. See Tom Miles, EU, Canada agree first workaround to avoid U.S. block on
WTO judges, REUTERS (July 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-eucanada/eu-canada-agree-first-workaround-to-avoid-u-s-block-on-wto-judges-

idUSKCN1UK2QY [https://perma.cc/R5B2-BKKG] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
350. European Commission Press Release IP/20/113, Trade: EU and 16 WTO
Members Agree to Work Together on an Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (Jan.
24,

2020),

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_113

[https://perma.cc/YX8V-Q2V4] (archived Sept. 30, 2020).
351. Id.
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reformed WTO Appellate Body becomes fully operational" 352 and also
notes that the Ministers have "taken notice of the recent engagement
of President Trump on WTO reform." 353
This dispute-settlement arrangement between the EU and sixteen
nations is permitted under Article 25 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding. 354 Article 25 permits WTO members to resort to

"expeditious arbitration"35 5 instead of the formal WTO disputesettlement procedures as long as the arbitration is mutually agreed
upon (including procedures), the parties agree to be bound by the
arbitration award, and notification is provided to all WTO members.3 56
This coalition is not only a solution to the US obstruction of the
WTO dispute-settlement system-it has political significance. It
consists of many economies forming an alliance on a critical trade
issue-the orderly resolution of trade disputes. Most notably, this
alliance includes China but not the United States. 35 7 China's
participation indicates "that China is not opportunistically taking

advantage of the fact that the U.S. is trying to destroy the system ....
It is sending a message that for the time being it is committed to
preserving a rules-based trading system."3 58 Moreover, the members of
this coalition have issued an open invitation to all other WTO members
that they are welcome to join.35 9 If a large number of nations
eventually join the coalition (or at least the ones that regularly bring
disputes to the WTO), they will implement the WTO Agreement among
themselves-moving on without the United States.
In summary, the Poison Pill provides middle powers like Canada
and developing nations an incentive to enter into large, overlapping
FTAs like the CPTPP or the proposed RCEP. It is worth noting that
the United States is not a member of the CPTPP or RCEP. An FTA-

restrictive clause like the Poison Pill also encourages nations to think
outside the "FTA-box." The BRI is one method for Canada to engage

352.

Statement by Ministers, Davos, Switzerland, EUROPA.EU (Jan. 24, 2020),

https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doelib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158596.pdf.

[https://perma.cc/24DK-MC4C] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Statement by
Ministers].
353. Id.
354. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, app. 1 annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/28-dsue.htm#25
[https://perma.cc/PGE46Q46] (archived Aug. 18, 2020).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See Naomi Powell, U.S. 'IncreasinglyIsolated' as China Among 15 Nations
Joining Canada-EU Trade Dispute Model,
FIN. POST (Jan.24, 2020),
https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/china-among- 15-countries-to-create-

new-appeals-system-based-on-canada-eu-deal [https://perma.cc/W6UP-FX3N] (archived
Aug. 18, 2020).
358. Id. (quoting Nicholas Lamp, a Queen's University law professor).
359. See Statement by Ministers, supra note 352.
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with China's powerful economy outside of a formal FTA arrangement.

A BRI-driven strategy could also increase the opportunity for FTAs
with African nations-this would synergize with the overlapping FTA

strategy as well. Ultimately, Canada will have to assess whether these
benefits are strong enough to outweigh any disadvantages of BRI
participation. Finally, the formation of an alternate WTO court by the
EU and sixteen nations demonstrates that strong coalitions of nations
can indeed attempt to work around US-initiated trade obstacles. This

works outside of the FTA-box by falling back to the rules of the WTO
but with an innovative dispute-settlement mechanism.

V. CONCLUSION
The Poison Pill represents a troubling new occurrence in a world

where WTO-principles are already being eroded by unilateral US trade
actions. The Poison Pill is a paradoxical inclusion of a trade-restrictive
clause in a purported free trade agreement. Although, the Poison Pill
only appears to be a withdrawal clause-functionally, it is an expulsion
clause that violates both the letter and the spirit of the WTO
Agreement. As a clause that is not only unnecessary to the formation
of an FTA but also one that actually raises barriers to trade (by
discouraging the formation of FTAs with other WTO members), the
Poison Pill is not permitted under GATT Article XXIV.
One interesting future question is whether the United States will

ask for a Poison Pill in the FTAs it attempts to negotiate in the future.
At this time, it appears that the United States is willing to even
pressure the United Kingdom for a Poison Pill in their proposed trade
agreement. An even more intriguing matter would be the US reaction
if China-following US footsteps-tried to include a Poison Pill in its

FTAs or make it a condition of loans.
As eloquently demonstrated by Hale almost a century ago,

normative baselines affect the outcome of what may appear as freely
negotiated contracts. This simple but powerful observation allows us
to conclude that the Poison Pill derives its force from the normative

baseline of MFN. The Poison Pill threatens Canada with expulsion
from the USMCA if Canada enters into an FTA with China. If Canada
wants to pursue increased economic engagement with China, the only
other option would be to enter into partial preferential trade
agreements-yet this is prohibited by GATT's MFN rule. If Canada is

to play by the rules, its most significant option-other than to enter
into a full-blown FTA with China-is prohibited by Canada's MFN
obligations. This is a strong argument why the WTO should condemn
the inclusion of the Poison Pill in any purported FTA. The Poison Pill
represents an attempt to twist a WTO rule in a manner that
contradicts the WTO's goal of free trade.
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Both Canada and Mexico are members of the CPTPP-this
mitigates the effect of any Poison Pill expulsion from the USMCA that

may be invoked against either of them by the United States. While this
is fortunate for both Canada and Mexico, it is still troubling for other
middle powers and developing nations since the United States has
indicated that it might consider using the clause in other FTAs. US
willingness to use the Poison Pill again-as an anti-China weapon-is

concerning under the present conditions of a persistent US-China
economic rivalry.
The most troubling point about the Poison Pill is the coercive
manner in which the United States obtained its inclusion. The United
States' strong-armed inclusion of the Poison Pill is but one of several

instances of unilateral US trade aggression that simply ignores the
United States' preexisting obligations under the WTO Agreement.

From the perspective of a middle power or developing nation, such
aggression provokes a consideration of mitigating strategies-not just
in this instance-but more generally as a response to a United States
that no longer can be credibly relied upon to honor its WTO obligations.
Since the Poison Pill is an example of progressively disturbing US

overreaching, it follows that the strategies that can be used to mitigate
the Poison Pill are also useful for hedging against future unrestrained
US trade actions. Both strategies considered in this Article provide

safety nets to the threat of expulsion by the United States by
strengthening economic ties outside of the United States. Given

China's status as a global economic superpower, those hedging
strategies inevitably involve China as well. Overlapping multilaterals
like the CPTPP protect Canada partially and may involve synergy with

a China-led RCEP in Asia. Direct participation in the China-led BRI
not only strengthens economic ties with China, outside of the FTA-box,

but may also assist Canada in developing ties (and potentially FTAs)
with other nations-particularly African nations. While Canada would
still have to carefully consider whether the benefits of BRI
participation outweigh any disadvantages to Canada, this Article
submits that the Poison Pill-perhaps contrary to the desires of the
United States-creates an incentive for countries like Canada to
participate.
In the midst of the US-China trade war, the United States should

consider how its actions may be critically viewed by its allies and trade
partners. The United States imposed unjustified aluminum and steel

tariffs in order to coerce not only Canada's agreement to the Poison Pill
(a provision which violates the WTO Agreement, as argued in this
Article) but also to extract WTO-prohibited VERs from Argentina,
Brazil, and South Korea. In these instances, the United States was
breaching the WTO Agreement in an aggressive, unilateral fashion
against long-standing trade partners like Canada. The US-created
WTO Appellate court crisis represents a significant turning point:

coalitions of nations are attempting to carry on with the WTO
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Agreement without the US-leaving China and the EU as the relevant
superpowers.

If the United States will not credibly commit itself to a rules-based
trading order, the world risks descending into a Hobbesian state where
"might makes right."36 0 In the wake of the US dismantling of the WTO,
the Poison Pill-whatever its actual short-term effect may be-

provokes non-US nations to think differently. Beyond any potential
economic benefits of transacting with China, there now exists an
arguably more important geopolitical question of checks and balances.
If the United States will not check itself with the WTO Agreement,
what will? The obvious answer is to turn to China, the EU, and large

trading blocs-superpowers that may have the "might" to
counterbalance an overreaching United States. Rather than deterring
nations like Canada from engaging with China, a Poison Pill
incentivizes middle powers and developing nations to find methods
around a Poison Pill-engaging in overlapping multilaterals and

engaging with China outside of FTAs. These two strategies align with
a broader imperative: dealing with a United States that will not
constrain itself to a rules-based trading order with even its longstanding allies and trading partners.

360. See Peter Van den Bossche, Appellate Body Member, World Trade Org.,
Farewell Speech (May 28, 2019) (transcript available at the World Trade Org.). Former
WTO Appellate Body member Peter Van den Bossche stated in his farewell speech: "A
return to some kind of pre-WTO dispute settlement system means a return to dispute
settlement in which economic and other might trumps legal right."). He also remarked:
"History will not judge kindly those responsible for the collapse of the WTO dispute
settlement system." See id.

